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Zoning and Land Use Law
by Dennis J. Webb, Jr.*
Marcia McCrory Ernst**
Joseph L. Cooley**
J. Chadwick Torri*...
and Victor A. Ellis .....
This Article provides a succinct and practical analysis of the significant judicial decisions in the area of zoning and land use law that were
handed down by Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2006 and
May 31, 2007. The cases surveyed fall primarily within five categories:
(1) condemnation, (2) nuisance and trespass, (3) easements and
restrictive covenants, (4) zoning, and (5) miscellaneous.
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CONDEMNATION

During the survey period, Georgia appellate courts decided several
condemnation cases, many of which did not involve novel issues. The
Georgia Supreme Court, however, did consider one interesting case
involving the eminent domain powers of private utility companies and
another case involving the date of taking for valuation purposes when
the condemnation petition is amended. Additionally, the Georgia
Supreme Court examined two cases addressing the public use requirement for urban redevelopment condemnations as well as a series of cases
dealing with various evidentiary and procedural issues.
A. ParamountPower of Electric Power Utility Companies to
Condemn Property
Recently, several counties have attempted to use their land use
regulatory powers to prevent or limit eminent domain condemnations by
electric power utility companies ("EPUC"). However, various superior
courts and the Georgia Supreme Court have rejected the counties'
actions and reaffirmed that the eminent domain powers of private
EPUCs preempt local zoning and land use laws.
In Forsyth County v.Georgia Transmission Corp.,' Forsyth County
enacted an ordinance that required the approval of the Forsyth County
Board of Commissioners before an EPUC could construct high-voltage
power lines.2 The supreme court held that the ordinance violated the
Home Rule Act of the Georgia constitution 3 by infringing on the EPUC's
exercise of the power of eminent domain.4
Georgia Transmission Company ("GTC") is a nonprofit corporation
comprised of multiple electric membership corporations that collectively
distribute, transmit, and sell electric power throughout Georgia. In 2002
GTC began plans to construct an electric transmission line in Forsyth
County and began acquiring property for the project.5
In June 2004 Forsyth County amended its code to create the Forsyth
County Power Transmission Line Overlay Zoning District (the "PTL-OD
Ordinance").6 The preamble to the resolution creating the PTL-OD

1.
2.

280 Ga. 664, 632 S.E.2d 101 (2006).
Id. at 664, 632 S.E.2d at 102.
3. GA. CONsT. art. IX, § 2, para. 1.
4. Forsyth County, 280 Ga. at 664, 632 S.E.2d at 102.
5. Id.
6. Id.; FORSYTH COUNTY, GA., UNIFIED DEV. CODE §§ 21-6.1 to -6.5 (Municode through
June 2004 Amendments) invalidatedby Forsyth County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 280 Ga.
664, 632 S.E.2d 101 (2006).
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Ordinance provided that the construction or installation of any new
electric power transmission lines "'shall be prohibited unless and until
the electric utility associated therewith successfully complies with the
PTL-OD procedures being created by this Resolution.' ' 7 The new PTLOD Ordinance required GTC to apply for a zoning map amendment for
its proposed transmission line and obtain overlay zoning approval from
Additionally, the
Forsyth County for construction and operation.'
ordinance required GTC to prove that "the conditions governing the
construction, operation, and maintenance of the transmission [line were]
appropriate."9 The PTL-OD Ordinance further allowed GTC to apply for
an overlay prior to acquiring property for the transmission line in order
to "'allow Forsyth County to exercise reasonable zoning regulatory
authority over the siting of high power transmission lines without first
requiring the utility to go to the possible wasteful expense of acquiring
ownership of its preferred route before obtaining final land use
authorization."' 10
GTC brought a declaratory judgment action against Forsyth County
and its board of commissioners challenging the constitutionality of the
PTL-OD Ordinance. The trial court ruled that the PTL-OD Ordinance
was an unconstitutional infringement upon GTC's power of eminent
domain, thereby violating the home rule provisions of the state
constitution."
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court first noted that the Home Rule
Act of the Georgia constitution "grants the governing authority of each
county the legislative authority 'to adopt clearly reasonably ordinances,
resolutions, or regulations relating to its property, affairs, and local
government for which no provision has been made by general law and
which is not inconsistent with this Constitution.'"' 2 The court next
noted that the constitution "further provides that the powers granted to
counties pursuant to the home rule provision, 'shall not be construed to
...[any] [a]ction affecting the exercise of the power of eminent
extend to 13
domain."'

Forsyth County, 280 Ga. at 664-65, 632 S.E.2d at 102 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 665, 632 S.E.2d at 102 (citing FORSYTH COUNTY, GA., UNIFIED DEV. CODE
§ 21-6.5).
9. Id. (citing FORSYTH COUNTY, GA., UNIFIED DEV.CODE § 21-6.5(D)).
10. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 102-03 (quoting FORSYTH COUNTY, GA., UNIFIED DEv. CODE § 216.1).
11. Id. at 665, 632 S.E.2d at 103.
12. Id. at 665-66, 632 S.E.2d at 103 (emphasis added by court) (quoting GA. CONST. art.
IX, § 2, para. 1(a)).
13. Id. at 666, 632 S.E.2d at 103 (brackets in original) (emphasis added by court)
(quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(6)).
7.

8.
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Then, the supreme court stated that "[t]he general law authorizes an
EPUC to exercise the power of eminent domain to effectuate the purpose
of furnishing electric power and service."14 Thus, the court held that
"GTC is a condemning body with the authority to act as the exclusive
judge of the necessities of the public needs." 5
The supreme court noted that in the recent cases of Rabun County v.
Georgia Transmission Corp. 6 and Cobb County v. Georgia Transmission Corp.,"7 it held that "certain county ordinances violated the home
rule provision by effectively infringing on an EPUC's exercise of its
statutory power of eminent domain to acquire property for the construction of a high-voltage power line."" In both cases, the counties enacted
a moratorium on the construction of new high-voltage transmission lines,
and GTC brought declaratory judgment actions challenging the
ordinances. The trial courts in both cases determined that the ordinances infringed on GTC's power of eminent domain.' 9 In both cases, the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts' rulings, holding that
the "ordinances blocked GTC's purpose of constructing high voltage
transmission lines and thus violated the home rule provision by affecting
the power of eminent domain.""
However, in Forsyth County, the County argued that its PTL-OD
Ordinance, unlike the ordinances in Rabun County and Cobb County,
was not a moratorium or a per se obstruction to GTC's exercise of
eminent domain. 2' The County argued that its PTL-OD Ordinance
"does not unconstitutionally affect GTC's power of eminent domain
because it provides only 'modest oversight,' and fosters and augments,
rather than halts, an applicant's plans." 22 The Georgia Supreme Court
rejected these arguments, however, finding that the PTL-OD Ordinance
"forbids the erection of GTC's electric power transmission line unless
GTC successfully complies with the procedures established by the [PTLOD Ordinance, and it authorizes Forsyth County to deny 'any or all'

14. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 46-3-201(b)(9) (2004); O.C.G.A. § 22-3-20 (1982)).
15. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102.1 (Supp. 2007)).
16. 276 Ga. 81, 575 S.E.2d 474 (2003).
17. 276 Ga. 367, 578 S.E.2d 852 (2003).
18. Forsyth County, 280 Ga. at 666, 632 S.E.2d at 103 (citing Rabun County, 276 Ga.
at 86, 575 S.E.2d at 477; Cobb County, 276 Ga. at 367, 578 S.E.2d at 853).
19. Id. (citing Rabun County, 276 Ga. at 84, 575 S.E.2d at 476; Cobb County, 276 Ga.
at 367, 578 S.E.2d at 853).
20. Id. at 666-67, 632 S.E.2d at 103-04 (citing Rabun County, 276 Ga. at 86, 575 S.E.2d
at 478; Cobb County, 276 Ga. at 367, 578 S.E.2d at 853).
21. Id. at 667, 632 S.E.2d at 104.
22. Id.
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portions of an application." 23 Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that this "power to wholly preclude construction is an unconstitutional
infringement on GTC's legislatively-delegated power of eminent
domain. ,24
B. Date of Taking for Valuation Purposes is the Date that Condemnor Pays the Amount of the Special Master's Award into the Registry
of the Court
In Orr v. Georgia Transmission Corp. ("Orr i',), 25 the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that the Georgia Court of Appeals erred when it
determined in Orr v. Georgia Transmission Corp. ("Orr p,)2 6 that the
date of a taking occurs when the original condemnation petition is
filed. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice P. Harris Hines, the
supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, the date
of the taking occurred when the "condemnor paid the amount of the
special master's award into the registry of the court pursuant to the
superior court's order making [the] award the judgment of the court.""
On October 30, 2001, Georgia Transmission Corporation ("GTC") filed
a condemnation petition in the Forsyth County Superior Court seeking
a right of way easement for certain electric transmission lines. The
petition also sought an easement to enter onto adjoining lands to remove
dangerous trees ("dangerous tree maintenance easement").
On
December 19, 2001, the special master awarded Orr $15,775 as the fair
market value of the property condemned and $16,000 in consequential
damages to the remaining property.29
Thereafter, Orr timely filed a notice of appeal for a jury trial on the
issues of value and damages. Orr also filed exceptions to the ruling on
nonvalue issues, asserting that the portion of GTC's petition involving
the dangerous tree maintenance easement was vague and indefinite and
an unconstitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
superior court overruled the exceptions and entered ajudgment adopting
the award of the special master on March 22, 2002.30 "The judgment
provided that upon payment into the registry of the court the total sum
of $31,775, the condemnor would be vested with title to the condemned

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. (citing FORSYTH COUNTY, GA., UNIFIED DEV. CODE § 21-6.5(E)).
Id.
281 Ga. 754, 642 S.E.2d 809 (2007), rev'g 280 Ga. App. 251, 633 S.E.2d 564 (2006).
280 Ga. App. 251, 633 S.E.2d 564 (2006), rev'd, 281 Ga. 754, 642 S.E.2d 809 (2007).
Orr 11, 281 Ga. at 754, 642 S.E.2d at 809-10.
Id., 642 S.E.2d at 810.
Id.
Id. at 754-55, 642 S.E.2d at 810.
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property."3 1 On June 5, 2002,.'GTC paid the amount of the award into
the registry of the court.32
Before the case was called for trial on the issue of value and damages,
the Georgia Court of Appeals held in the case of Mosteller Mill, Ltd. v.
Georgia Power Co.33 that "a 'danger[ous] tree' maintenance easement
is effective only if it accurately and definitely describes the interest
being taken."3 4 Accordingly, on October 13, 2005, the parties filed a
consolidated pretrial order in which they stipulated to an amendment to
the petition to remove the dangerous tree maintenance easement. 35
Orr then filed a motion to elect October 13, 2005, the date of the
amendment, as the date of taking.36 Citing Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 22-2-109, 3 7 the superior court rejected
such election and ordered the date of taking to be October 30, 2001, the
date GTC filed its original petition. 38 Orr appealed to the Georgia
Court of Appeals the trial court order setting the date of taking as the
date of the original petition. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court order.3 9
In doing so, the Georgia Court of Appeals distinguished Dorsey v.
Department of Transportation,° which allowed a condemnee the right
to elect whether the date of taking was the date of the filing of the
original declaration of taking or the date of the filing of an amendment.4 ' The Georgia Court of Appeals in Orr I determined that an
election was not required in every case in which a condemnation petition
is amended.42 Additionally, in contrast to the amendment in Dorsey,
the amended petition in Orr abandoned the acquisition of the inadequately described dangerous tree maintenance easement. 43 Thus, the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the amendment deleted mere
surplusage in the petition and did not pass title for the easement to

31. Orr I, 280 Ga. App. at 252, 633 S.E.2d at 565.
32. Orr H, 281 Ga. at 755, 642 S.E.2d at 810.
33. 271 Ga. App. 287, 609 S.E.2d 211 (2005).
34. OrrI, 280 Ga. App. at 252, 633 S.E.2d at 565-66 (citing MostellerMill, Ltd., 271 Ga.
App. at 289-90, 609 S.E.2d at 214).
35. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 566.
36. Orr H, 281 Ga. at 755, 642 S.E.2d at 810.
37. O.C.G.A. § 22-2-109 (1982 & Supp. 2007).
38. Orr H, 281 Ga. at 755, 642 S.E.2d at 810.
39. Orr 1, 280 Ga. App. at 251, 633 S.E.2d at 565.
40. 248 Ga. 34, 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).
41. OrrI, 280 Ga. App. at 254-55, 633 S.E.2d at 567 (citing Dorsey, 248 Ga. at 37, 279
S.E.2d at 710).
42. Id. at 255, 633 S.E.2d at 567.
43. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 567-68.
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GTC.44 Further, contrary to the circumstances presented in Dorsey, the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the record did not show any
possibility that GTC would reap any benefit from having filed a faulty
petition.4 5 Instead, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that to hold
otherwise would grant the condenee a windfall, assuming that the
market value of the condemned right-of-way increased substantially in
the four years between the filing of the original petition and the
amendment.4 6
However, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
"b]oth the analysis and the conclusion of the Court of Appeals are
flawed."47 The supreme court pointed out that the focus of the Georgia
Court of Appeals was O.C.G.A. section 22-2-109(a), which provides that
the date of taking is the date of the filing of the condemnation proceedings for public road and street purposes.4 8 The supreme court noted,
however, that this case concerned a condemnation for the construction
of electric transmission lines and not for a public road or street.49
Next, the supreme court noted that "[iun contrast to [O.C.G.A. section]
22-2-109, [O.C.G.A. sections] 22-2-110 and 22-2-111 are not limited to
condemnation actions involving public roads and streets, but are
generally applicable in [all] condemnation proceedings before a special
master." °
The Georgia Supreme Court then noted that "[O.C.G.A. section] 22-2111 mandates that the trial court enter a judgment condemning the
property... when the condemnor pays into the registry of the court the
amount provided in the award."5 Then the supreme court cited Arnold
v. State Highway Department8 2 which held that "'the law specifically
provides that the award of the special master shall condemn and vest
title to the property ...in the condemning body upon the deposit of such
sum into the registry of the court .... [No property is taken under this
special master procedure until the payment is made."'5 3 Accordingly,
the supreme court concluded that in the circumstances of this case, the

44. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 568.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Orr 11, 281 Ga. at 756, 642 S.E.2d at 811.
48. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 22-2-109(a)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 756-57, 642 S.E.2d at 811 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 22-2-109, -110, -111 (1982 &
Supp. 2007)).
51. Id. at 757, 642 S.E.2d at 811 (citing O.C.G.A. § 22-2-111).
52. 116 Ga. App. 201, 156 S.E.2d 469 (1967).
53. Orr 11, 281 Ga. at 757, 642 S.E.2d at 811-12 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Arnold, 116 Ga. App. at 203, 156 S.E.2d at 470).
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date of taking is governed by "the date the condemnor paid the amount
of the special master's award into the registry of the court pursuant to
the superior
court's order making said award the judgment of the
54
court."
C. Eminent Domain for Economic Redevelopment-Public Use
Requirement
Two years ago, the United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v.
City of New London5" sparked attention to the issue of using eminent
domain for economic redevelopment purposes. Additionally, Georgia has
had its own controversies regarding eminent domain for economic
redevelopment. Indeed, two cases decided by the Georgia Court of
Appeals reviewed condemnations brought under Georgia's Urban
Redevelopment Law56 and the associated public use requirement.
1. Requirement and Burden to Show a Public Use Falls on
Condemnor. In City of Stockbridge v. Meeks," the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the city's condemnation
petition.5 8 The City of Stockbridge filed a condemnation petition to
acquire certain property, including that of Mark and Regina Meeks. The
Meekses operated a family florist business on the property. The
property was condemned by being declared a slum under Georgia's
Urban Redevelopment Law.59 One week before filing the petition, the
City adopted a resolution "declaring a need to build 'public facilities"' on
the property.6"
At the hearing before the special master, the City did not specify the
public purpose for the condemnation. The Meekses sought dismissal,
arguing that the City failed to plead that the proposed condemnation
was for a public purpose.6 ' The special master denied the Meekses'
motion, entered a condemnation award for the City, and awarded the
Meekses $325,000 for the condemned property and $96,500 for fixtures
and relocation expenses."
Upon review, the trial court dismissed the
City's condemnation petition for failure to set forth facts showing the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 754, 642 S.E.2d at 810.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
O.C.G.A. §§ 36-61-1 to -19 (2006).
283 Ga. App. 343, 641 S.E.2d 584 (2007).
Id. at 345, 641 S.E.2d at 586.
Id. at 343-44, 641 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 344, 641 S.E.2d at 585.
Id.
Id. at 343, 641 S.E.2d at 585.
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right to condemn pursuant to O.C.G.A. sections 22-2-102.2(1) and (5) 63
The statute requires that a condemnation petition "'set forth [the facts
showing the right to condemn' and the 'necessity to condemn the private
describing the public use for which the condemnor seeks the
property ...
64
property.'
The City appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, contending that
the trial court erred in dismissing its condemnation petition for three
reasons: (1) that "any failure by the City to show that the taking was
for a specific" purpose was not "raised before nor ruled upon by the
special master"; (2) that "the trial court dismissed the condemnation
petition without first finding that it had been filed in bad faith"; and (3)
that "it was the [Meekses'] burden to come forward with evidence
showing that the condemnation was for other than a public purpose and
that the petition was filed in bad faith. '65 The Georgia Court of
Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the petition.66
The Georgia Court of Appeals noted,
The record shows that the Meeks answered the City's petition
denying its right to condemn, stating that "[tihe [p]etition does not aver
and the City cannot prove facts entitling the City to take the Property";
that "the Property is not needed for any public purpose"; and that the
City's taking was for a private use. 7
Additionally, the record showed that prior to the special master's
hearing, the Meekses moved to dismiss the condemnation petition for
lack of evidence that the taking was for a valid public purpose. Further,
the record showed that the Meekses' exceptions and objections to the
6
special master's award raised the same matters. Therefore, the court
of appeals held that "the dismissal of the condemnation petition was "not
for review. 69
error for any failure to preserve the issue of specific use
The Georgia Court of Appeals also rejected the City's other arguments
on appeal, stating that "it is clear that the burden to show a taking for
7°
Also,
a public purpose lies with the condemnor, not the condemnee."
the requirement that the condemnor plead "'facts showing the right to

63. .Id. at 344, 641 S.E.2d at 584; O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102.2(1), (5) (Supp. 2007).
64. City of Stockbridge, 283 Ga. App. at 344, 641 S.E.2d at 585 (alteration in original)
(brackets in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102.2(1), -102.2(5)).
65. Id. at 343, 641 S.E.2d at 585.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 344, 641 S.E.2d at 585 (brackets in original).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 345, 641 S.E.2d at 586.
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condemn[]' and 'the necessity to condemn the private property and
describing the public use for which the condemnor seeks the property[,]'
... is neither presumed nor71conditioned upon a preliminary finding of
bad faith in the trial court."
2. Public Use Challenge Barred by Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel. In Talley v. Housing Authority of Columbus,7 2 the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel barred the condemnee's challenge to the legality of the initial
taking of his property through a condemnation proceeding.73 The court
74
of appeals also held that the Urban Redevelopment Law ("URL")
authorized the city housing authority to abandon any "public use" of the
condemned property and sell the property to private citizens for other
75
uses.

In 1994 the city housing authority commenced a condemnation
proceeding against Talley's property. The superior court entered
judgment conveying full title to the property to the housing authority
upon payment into the court registry of the $17,500 awarded by the
special master to the property owners.76
In 2003 Talley filed an action against the housing authority, claiming
that it unlawfully took his property in 1994 and demanding its
return.77 Talley also asserted that in 1999 the housing authority
"abandoned any public use of the property and sold it to a private citizen
for $42,800." 78
The housing authority moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the issue of
the legality of the taking of Talley's property for a valid public purpose
was decided adversely to him in the initial condemnation action, in a
motion to set aside the condemnation judgment ... [which was] denied
by the [superior court] in 1997, and in a [separate] action filed by
Talley against the [housing authority] in federal district court in
2004. 79

71. Id. (brackets in original) (citation omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102.2(1), (5)).
72. 279 Ga. App. 94, 630 S.E.2d 550 (2006).
73. Id. at 95, 630 S.E.2d at 551 (citing State v. Lejeune, 277 Ga. 749, 756, 594 S.E.2d
637, 643-44 (2004)).
74. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-61-1 to -19.
75. Talley, 279 Ga. App. at 95-96, 630 S.E.2d at 552 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-61-10(a)).
76. Id. at 94, 630 S.E.2d at 551.
77. Id. at 95, 630 S.E.2d at 551.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment."0 The court
of appeals affirmed that Talley's challenge to the legality of the 1994
taking was barred by the principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel."1
The court of appeals also held that the housing authority was entitled
to summary judgment on Talley's claim concerning the abandonment of
the public use and sale of the property to a private citizen. 2 The court
of appeals determined that "the URL authorizes Georgia municipalities
and counties, either directly or through urban redevelopment agencies
or housing authorities, to exercise the power of eminent domain for the
acquisition and redevelopment of urban property which has been found
to be a 'slum area."'8 3 Furthermore, to effectuate such redevelopment,
the condemnor is authorized under the URL to "sell, lease or otherwise
transfer condemned property 'for public use'; or for various specified
private uses, [including], 'residential, recreational, commercial,
industrial'; or for 'other uses."'8'4
D.

Evidentiary and ProceduralIssues

A series of cases decided during the survey period addressed various
evidentiary and procedural issues presented in condemnation actions.

1. Property's Potential Commercial Value Not Relevant.

In

Housing Authority of Macon v. Younis,"5 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that evidence concerning a condemned property's potential
commercial value was not relevant to the determination of just and
adequate compensation in light of a federal order restricting the use of
the property to a public playground." In 1984 a federal court entered
a racial desegregation order requiring the Bibb County Board of
Education (the "School Board"), which then owned the property, to tear
down a school on the property and deed it to the City of Macon (the
"City") for use as a public playground.87
In September 1985 the School Board transferred the property to the
City, noting the specific use restriction. Two years later, the School

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id., 630 S.E.2d at 552.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 36-61-1 to -9, -17).
Id. at 96, 630 S.E.2d at 552 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-61-10(a)).

85. 279 Ga. App. 599, 631 S.E.2d 802 (2006).
86. Id. at 599, 631 S.E.2d at 803.
87. Id. at 599-600, 631 S.E.2d at 803 (citing Adams v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 585 F. Supp.
215, 222 (M.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 770 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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Board quitclaimed all of its remaining interest in the property to the
City, claiming that it was releasing the property from all of the
restrictions found in the September 1985 deed.8
Thereafter, in 1989 the City sold a portion of the property to the
Younises. The Younises also purchased an adjoining tract of property.
In 2002 the City's housing authority initiated separate condemnation
proceedings to acquire the Younises' properties. The special masters
rendered awards, and the cases were consolidated and appealed to the
Bibb County Superior Court. 9
The Younises asserted that their tracts could be combined to create
increased potential commercial value. The housing authority filed a
motion in limine to prohibit any evidence relating to the commercial
value of the property based on the 1984 federal order restricting the use
of the property to a public playground. The superior court denied the
motion in limine but certified the decision for immediate review by the
Georgia Court of Appeals. °
The court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding that the
"federal order containing the land-use restriction was neither challenged
nor otherwise rendered unenforceable at the time the [housing aluthority
initiated the condemnation proceedings."9 1 The court of appeals further
held that "the School Board's purported 1987 transfer of the property to
the City free 'from all restrictions' was ineffectual, because the School
Board did not have the power to unilaterally extinguish a court-imposed
restriction on the use of the land through a quitclaim deed."9 2 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that because "the properties were
restricted for use as a public playground, there was no basis for the
admission of evidence regarding any potential commercial value that the
properties could have had under other, nonexistent circumstances."93
2. Source of Funding for Highway Project Not Relevant. In
H.D. McCondichie Properties v. Georgia Department of Transportation,9 4 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that evidence concerning the
source of funding for a highway construction project was not relevant to

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 600, 631 S.E.2d at 803.
Id., 631 S.E.2d at 804.
Id.
Id.

92. Id. (citing Canoeside Props. v. Livsey, 277 Ga. 425, 428, 589 S.E.2d 116, 119
(2003)).
93. Id. at 601, 631 S.E.2d at 804 (citing Wright v. MARTA, 248 Ga. 372, 373, 283
S.E.2d 466, 468 (1981)).
94. 280 Ga. App. 197, 633 S.E.2d 558 (2006).
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the issue of just and adequate compensation for the property taken. 95
The court of appeals also held that the issue of who had hired a
particular expert appraiser was not relevant to the issue of just and
adequate compensation.9" In so holding, the court of appeals emphasized that "just and adequate compensation for the property taken was
the only relevant issue for the jury to determine" and that the trial court
97
had properly excluded the evidence in question.
3. Evidence of Compulsory Sale to Condemning Authority Not
Admissible. In Gwinnett County v. Howington," the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that the compulsory sale of land to a condemning
authority is inadmissible in a condemnation action on the issue of the
land's value. 99 Gwinnett County initiated condemnation proceedings to
acquire two easements on a twenty-six acre tract of property owned by
Howington. The following month, the entire tract of property was
rezoned for commercial and high density residential use. A year later,
the Gwinnett County School District (the "School") condemned the entire
twenty-six acre tract of property. ° °
During the trial of the County's condemnation action, Howington filed
a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of the School's taking. The
trial court agreed with Howington that the School's condemnation was
irrelevant to the value of the easements sought by the County. The jury
rendered an award consistent with the value and consequential damages
testimony offered by Howington's expert, and the County appealed to the
Georgia Court of Appeals.' 0 '
The County asserted on appeal that it should have been allowed to
introduce evidence of the School's taking to challenge Howington's
expert. The School claimed this evidence would rebut the expert's
testimony that the property could not be developed in the manner for
which it had been rezoned.'0 2 The court of appeals disagreed, noting
that "'the courts of [Georgia] have long held that sales of land to
condemning authorities are inadmissible as evidence in condemnation

95. Id. at 198, 633 S.E.2d at 560.
96. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 559 (citing Logan v. Chatham County, 113 Ga. App. 491, 493,
148 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1966)).
97. Id.
98. 280 Ga. App. 347, 634 S.E.2d 157 (2006).
99. Id. at 348-49, 634 S.E.2d at 159.

100. Id. at 347, 634 S.E.2d at 158.
101.

Id.

102. Id. at 348, 634 S.E.2d at 159.
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proceedings on the issue of the value of the land sought to be condemned.'"103
The court of appeals held:
[T]he admission of such evidence would have been improper because (1)
Howington's compulsory sale of the 26 acres to the School District a
year after the County initiated its condemnation action would not have
affected the value of Howington's land at the time of the County's
taking a year earlier, and (2) the [School's] inability to use the property
as rezoned did not change the fact that the property was already in the
process of being rezoned in a manner that affected its value for
purposes of just and adequate compensation to Howington at the time
of the County's taking."°4
This decision recognized the long standing principles of law that just and
adequate compensation is determined as of the date of taking and that
the fact finder may appropriately consider all reasonable and probable
uses for the property when determining its value.0 5

4. Evidence Contesting Legality of Taking Properly Excluded
and Expert Properly Allowed to Testify that House Had No
Valuable Architectural Components Affecting Value. In Mayo v.
City of Stockbridge, °6 the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed procedural and evidentiary issues raised on appeal by Mayo, the property
owner. 0 7 First, Mayo challenged the superior court's refusal to hear
evidence about the legality of the taking. Mayo claimed that the City
0 8
had failed to establish that the taking was for a public purpose.
However, the trial court found, and the court of appeals agreed, that
Mayo was estopped from contesting the legality of the taking because
she had withdrawn the funds deposited into the registry of the court
without having properly challenged the adequacy of the City's condemnation petition or the special master's award. 0 9
The court of appeals cited Styers v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.," 0 in
which the Georgia Supreme Court held:

103. Id. (quoting Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App. 723, 724, 278
S.E.2d 429, 430 (1981)).
104. Id. at 349, 634 S.E.2d at 159 (citation omitted) (citing Wright, 248 Ga. at 373, 283
S.E.2d at 468; Carriage Hills Assocs. v. Mun. Elec. Auth. of Ga., 264 Ga. App. 192, 193,590
S.E.2d 156, 158 (2003)).
105. Id.
106. 285 Ga. App. 58, 646 S.E.2d 79 (2007).
107. Id. at 58, 646 S.E.2d at 80.
108. Id., 646 S.E.2d at 80-81.
109. Id. at 60, 646 S.E.2d at 81.
110. 263 Ga. 856, 439 S.E.2d 640 (1994).
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"In order to obtain review of the non-value issues determined by the
special master, a party must file exceptions with the superior court
prior to that court's entry of judgment on the special master's
award.... Failure to file exceptions results in a waiver of the right to
1
further litigate non-value issues.""
Mayo failed to challenge the propriety of the taking before the special
magistrate and likewise failed to file exceptions with the superior
court.112 Mayo only filed a notice of appeal to a jury based on her
"'dissatisfaction with the estimated amount of compensation set forth in
the Award of the Special Master.'""1 3
This notice of appeal was
inadequate to preserve nonvalue issues.'
Further, the court of appeals noted that Mayo withdrew the money
awarded from the registry of the court. 5
The court of appeals
concluded that by this action, Mayo "acquiesced in the judgment of the
superior court vesting title to the subject property" to the City and that
Mayo was estopped from protesting the validity of the condemna116
tion.
Next, Mayo challenged the superior court's ruling to allow testimony
by the City's expert that the house on the property, which was constructed around 1912, had no architectural components that enhanced the
overall value of the condemned property.1 7 The court of appeals held
that the City's expert witness was qualified to testify that the house had
no valuable architectural components." 8 The court of appeals noted
that the witness had viewed the house, had nearly fifty years of
experience in appraising real estate, had completed continuing education
courses in appraising historic properties, had owned and restored similar
houses, and had experience in removing and selling architectural
components of historic homes.' 19 In light of such evidence, the court
of appeals held that "the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the [expert's] opinion to go to the jury, to be given such weight
as it saw fit." 2 °

111. Mayo, 285 Ga. App. at 59, 646 S.E.2d at 81 (alteration in original) (quoting Styers,
263 Ga. at 857-58, 439 S.E.2d at 641).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Styers, 263 Ga. at 858, 439 S.E.2d at 641-42).
115. Id. at 60, 646 S.E.2d at 81.
116. Id.
117. Id., 646 S.E.2d at 82.
118. Id. at 60-61, 646 S.E.2d at 82.
119. Id. at 60, 646 S.E.2d at 82.
120. Id. at 61, 646 S.E.2d at 82.
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NUISANCE AND TRESPASS

The nuisance and trespass jurisprudence of the Georgia Supreme
Court and Georgia Court of Appeals over the survey period was
dominated by surface water invasions. Another nuisance case concerned
the rarely invoked "free public services doctrine," and a final case
addressed the respective fact-finding roles of a jury and trial court in
equity cases.
A.

Surface Water Invasion

1.
Trial Court Vested with Broad Discretion in Crafting
Nuisance Remedy. In Menzies v. Hall,12 ' the defendant removed
most of the grass from his property and replaced it with gravel intending
to build a parking area to store an inventory of used cars. The modifications to the land substantially increased the amount of water run-off
onto the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff complained to the defendant,
and the defendant retained an engineer to design a water detention
plan. When implementation of the detention plan did not abate the
water flow onto the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff sued, alleging a
continuous nuisance and trespass. 22 The trial court issued a temporary injunction directing the defendant "to stop any excessive water runoff onto [the plaintiff's] property but leaving it up to [the defendant] and
his experts
to determine what changes were necessary to achieve this
23
result."
Run-off continued to concentrate and disperse across the plaintiffs
property at greater than pre-development levels, and the plaintiff filed
a motion for contempt. The trial court held the defendant in contempt
based on his failure to take corrective action. The trial court found that
although some improvements had been made to the defendant's
property, these improvements were insufficient to cure the run-off
problem. The trial court ordered the defendant to construct a detention
pond, but he was unable to complete the construction after hitting
bedrock. In its final order, the trial court (1) declared the existence of
a nuisance, (2) ordered the defendant to implement an engineering plan
to which the parties had stipulated, and (3) ordered the defendant to

121.
122.
123.

281 Ga. 223, 637 S.E.2d 415 (2006).
Id. at 224, 637 S.E.2d at 416.
Id.
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refrain 12from
storing or parking unattended cars on the rear portion of
4
the lot.
The defendant argued on appeal that the remedy fashioned by the
trial court "constituted an abuse of discretion because it imposed a
greater restriction than necessary to protect [the plaintiff]."125 The
Georgia Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument, holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining whether and
how to require the defendant to abate the flow of water onto the
plaintiff's property.126 The court determined that the trial court's
order "reasonably balanced [the defendant's] interest in operating his
business on [his property] and [the plaintiff's] valuable right to have her
property free from artificial runoff without requiring [the defendant] to
do the impossible."1 27
2. Sale of Nuisance Causing Property No Protection From
Liability. In Green v. Eastland Homes, Inc.,28 Dozier Development
Co. ("Dozier") prepared a tract of undeveloped property for a residential
subdivision "by clear-cutting the trees and vegetation and creating an
infrastructure through grading, providing for drainage, and installing
roads, curbs, and sewer lines."129 Dozier was also responsible for
erosion control at the site. Dozier sold the property to Eastland Homes,
Inc. ("Eastland"). 3 ° "Eastland developed the property further by doing
final grading, building houses and driveways
on the lots, backfilling the
3
sites, and completing the landscaping."' '
While Eastland owned the property, a "rainstorm resulted in torrents
of water cascading down the slope from the lots and onto [the plaintiff's]
backyard, immersing the backyard and patio and filling up the
crawlspace under [the plaintiff's] home, which damaged the furnace and
air conditioner." 132 Subsequent rainstorms produced similar results
and caused cracks in the walls and structure of the
plaintiff's house and
133
resulted in the growth of mold under the house.

124.
125.
126.
(1999)).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 224-25, 637 S.E.2d at 417.
Id.
Id. (citing Goode v. Mountain Lake Invs., 271 Ga. 722, 723, 524 S.E.2d 229, 231
Id. at 226, 637 S.E.2d at 418.
284 Ga. App. 643, 644 S.E.2d 479 (2007).
Id. at 644, 644 S.E.2d at 480.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The plaintiff sued Dozier, Eastland, and the previous landowner for
nuisance and trespass, claiming that the defendants "had disturbed and
developed the land in such a way as to artificially increase the amount
of water running down the slope."" 4 The trial court granted summary
judgment to Dozier and the previous owner but denied summary
judgment to Eastland. The plaintiff appealed the grant of summary
judgment to Dozier while Eastland appealed the denial of its motion for
summary judgment.135
The Georgia Court of Appeals noted that the Georgia Supreme Court
had recently reiterated the law governing surface water run-off.'3 6 The
supreme court in Menzies v. Hall 37 held that "'[i]n surface water runoff disputes where two lots adjoin, the lower lot owes a servitude to the
higher, so far as to receive the water which naturally runs from it,
provided the owner of the latter has done no act to increase such flow by
artificial means.""3
The supreme court in Greenwald v. Kersh'3 9
held that "'[a]lthough property must accept the natural runoff of water
from neighboring lands, an artificial increase' or
concentration of water
40
discharge may give rise to a cause of action. "
Applying the foregoing rules, the court reasoned that the question is
"whether [the plaintiff] presented evidence showing that Dozier and
Eastland engaged in activities that artificially increased the water runoff
from their upper land onto [the plaintiff's] lower land."' 4 ' The plaintiff
presented an expert affidavit that the development of the upper property
resulted in the flooding of the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff tendered
its expert's Flood Inspection Report, detailing the expert's observations
concerning the substantial erosion of the two upper lots, which had no
grass or groundcover. Noticeable gullies and channels on the lots
channeled the full force of the rainwater downhill towards the plaintiff's
land. The volume of water cascading down the hill overran the silt

134. Id. at 644-45, 644 S.E.2d at 481. The plaintiff also alleged personal injury
resulting from the mold growth. Id. at 645, 644 S.E.2d at 481.
135. Id. at 645, 644 S.E.2d at 481.
136. Id.
137. 281 Ga. 223, 637 S.E.2d 415 (2006).
138. Green, 284 Ga. App. at 645, 644 S.E.2d at 481 (quoting Menzies, 281 Ga. at 225,
637 S.E.2d at 417 (citing McMillen Dev. Corp. v. Bull, 228 Ga. 826, 828, 188 S.E.2d 491,
493 (1972)).
139. 265 Ga. App. 196, 593 S.E.2d 381 (2004).
140. 284 Ga. App. at 645,644 S.E.2d at 481 (brackets in original) (quoting Greenwald,
265 Ga. App. at 198, 593 S.E.2d at 383) (citing Sumitomo Corp. of Am. v. Deal, 256 Ga.
App. 703, 705, 569 S.E.2d 608, 611 (2002) (holding that a landowner on a higher property
has no right to cause water to flow onto lower land in a way that does not otherwise
naturally occur)).
141. Id.
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fence, causing it to collapse. Another expert confirmed these observations in a second affidavit. The first expert exposed the defendants'
flawed method of calculating groundwater seepage. The expert also
faulted the removal of overburden soil from the upper lots.'42
The plaintiff's expert "testified that Dozier's development activities in
developing the infrastructure (initial clear-cutting and grading, building
of impervious roads, and placing of in-ground facilities) contributed to
the excessive runoff."'
He also testified that Eastland's activities in
"grading the lots in a nonconical manner (so as to create areas where
water was allowed to collect and then funnel down the hillside), in
removing overburden soils, and in creating more
impervious surfaces,
44
further contributed to the excessive runoff."

The plaintiff also presented lay testimony consistent with the
conclusions of her expert. 45 Three long-time neighbors "testified that
they witnessed the ...flooding of [the plaintiff's] yard, which flooding
they had not seen before that time but which they had seen several
times since." 146

The plaintiff testified that flooding had not occurred

prior to the development activities of Dozier and Eastland. 47 Finally,
the plaintiff "presented numerous photographs displaying the gullies
and channels beginning in the upper barren backyards and continuing
down the hillside."'48
The court held that the combination of the lay testimony concerning
the excessive run-off and the expert testimony that the run-off was
caused by the development and construction activities of Dozier and
Eastland required that the court reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to Dozier and
affirm the trial court's denial of
149
summary judgment to Eastland.

On appeal, Dozier and Eastland repeatedly directed the court's
attention to other evidence showing that water run-off problems onto the
plaintiff's property preexisted any development activities on the upper
property. Dozier and Eastland argued that such evidence expressly
contradicted the lay witnesses' testimony that the flooding was not
preexisting. 5 ° However, the court noted that "on summary judgment,

142. Id. at 646, 644 S.E.2d at 481-82.
143. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 482.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 647, 644 S.E.2d at 482 (citing Ponce de Leon Condos. v. DiGirolamo, 238 Ga.
188, 191, 232 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1977)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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neither [the appellate court] nor the lower court may consider the
credibility of witnesses, which is a matter for the jury to resolve."151
Dozier and Eastland also argued that because "DeKalb County
approved their development activities, they [could not] be held liable for
a nuisance resulting therefrom."'5 2 The court rejected that argument
based on the plain terms of O.C.G.A. section 41-1-1,153 providing that
"'[a] nuisance is anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to

another and the fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful shall not
54
keep it from being a nuisance.'"'
Next, Dozier and Eastland argued that the plaintiff must identify
155
specific acts of negligence on their part before liability may attach.
The court rejected that argument, noting the following:
"[n]egligence is not ...a necessary ingredient of a cause of action
growing out of a nuisance. A nuisance may arise through acts and
conduct done within the pale of the law and executed with due care;
and yet if the result attained injures the property or individual rights
of another by causing a nuisance, the maintainer must either abate the
nuisance or else respond in damages."' 56
Additionally, Dozier argued that because nine months passed between
its development activities and the flooding, its actions could not have
caused the excessive run-off.157 The court similarly rejected that
argument, noting that "[b]eyond the fact that the vagaries of weather
may account for such, this is simply a matter which weighs in Dozier's
favor that may be argued before the jury; it does not mandate summary
judgment in its favor." 58
Finally, Dozier and Eastland argued that because they no longer
owned the property, they could not be held liable for continuing
nuisance.1 5 9 The court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had
rejected that argument, specifically in the context of a landowner suing
for excessive run-off:

151. Id. (citing Columbus Clinic, P.C. v. Liss, 252 Ga. App. 559, 562, 556 S.E.2d 215,
218 (2001)).
152. Id.
153. O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 (1997).
154. Green, 284 Ga. App. at 647, 644 S.E.2d at 482 (brackets in original) (emphasis
added by court) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1).
155. Id. at 648, 644 S.E.2d at 483.
156. Id. (quoting City of Macon v. Roy, 34 Ga. App. 603, 606, 130 S.E. 700, 702 (1925)).
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Tensar Earth Techs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 267 Ga. App. 45, 50, 598
S.E.2d 815, 820 (2004)).
159. Id.
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"The fact that at the time the suit was filed the defendant had sold his
property, from which the alleged cause of the injury arose, does not
absolve him from being a continuing wrongdoer or from the responsibility of remedying its cause. The evidence showed that the defendant
created the nuisance and that it was continuing. The trial court was
authorized to restrain it and
to require the defendant to cease and
16 °
desist from continuing it."
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's action to recover damages
against the alleged creators of the run-off nuisance was authorized,
regardless of ownership of the property."' 1
3. Governmental Immunity No Bar to Municipal Liability for
6
Continuing Nuisance. In City of Atlanta v. Broadnax,"
' homeowners brought a nuisance action against the City of Atlanta for the
recurrent flooding of their homes. The flooding was allegedly due to an
overflow from the City's combined system for the drainage of sewer
water and storm water. The plaintiffs contended that the drainage
system, built in 1915, lacked the capacity necessary to handle the
increased drainage resulting from the tremendous growth and development of the area. 63 The plaintiffs also alleged that the City chronically failed to make regular pickups of trash and yard debris in the
neighborhood, resulting in the clogging of storm water catch basins."6
The jury returned
a verdict awarding the plaintiffs a total of $1,854,300
65
in damages.
On appeal and at trial, the City asserted the defense of governmental
immunity. The City relied on the rule announced in Rogers v. City of
Atlanta1 6 that
"[t]he duties of municipal authorities in adopting a general plan of
drainage, and in determining when, where, and of what size and at
what level drains or sewers shall be built, are of a quasi-judicial
nature, involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and wide
discretion; and the municipality is not liable for an error of judgment

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. (quoting McMillen Dev. Corp., 228 Ga. at 828, 188 S.E.2d at 493).
Id. at 649, 644 S.E.2d at 483.
285 Ga. App. 430, 646 S.E.2d 279 (2007).
Id. at 430, 646 S.E.2d at 282.
Id. at 431, 646 S.E.2d at 282.
Id. at 430, 646 S.E.2d at 282.
61 Ga. App. 444, 6 S.E.2d 144 (1939).
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on the part
of the authorities in locating or planning such improve67
ments. 0
The Georgia Court of Appeals distinguished Rogers, however, on the
grounds that it involved a negligence claim, not a nuisance claim. 68
Further, a city may be liable for damages it causes from the operation
or maintenance of a nuisance, irrespective of whether the city is
exercising a governmental function.' 69 As such, "'[W]here a municipality negligently constructs or undertakes to maintain a sewer or drainage
system which causes the repeated flooding of property, a continuing,
abatable nuisance is established, for which the municipality is liable."'17 ° The court rejected the City's contention that there was no
evidence that the City had in fact maintained a nuisance.' 7 ' The court
determined that the plaintiffs presented evidence that over a period of
decades, the neighborhood residents made numerous flooding complaints
to the City and that throughout that period, the City's engineers were
aware that the neighborhood was prone to flooding.172 Accordingly, the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment on
73
the jury verdict. 1
On cross-appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that the plaintiffs "were not entitled to recover
damages for both the diminution in the value of their property and the
costs of repair."174
Based on cases such as Georgia Northeastern
Railroad, Inc. v. Lusk, 75 the trial court charged the jury that "an
award of both the diminution in market value and costs to restore for
the same injury occasioned by the same nuisance would constitute a
double recovery of damages." 76 The plaintiffs objected to the charge
based on evidence that the repairs to their homes would not bring the

167. Broadnax, 285 Ga. App. at 431-32, 646 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Rogers, 61 Ga. App.
at 446, 6 S.E.2d at 146).
168. Id. at 432, 646 S.E.2d at 283.
169. Id. (citing Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 426, 249 S.E.2d 224, 229
(1978)).
170. Id. (quoting City of Roswell v. Bolton, 271 Ga. App. 1, 7, 608 S.E.2d 659, 665
(2004)).
171. Id. at 433, 646 S.E.2d at 283.
172. Id., 646 S.E.2d at 283-84.
173. Id. at 434, 646 S.E.2d at 285.
174. Id. at 438, 646 S.E.2d at 287.
175. 277 Ga. 245, 587 S.E.2d 643 (2003).
176. Broadnax, 285 Ga. App. at 438, 646 S.E.2d at 287 (citing Ga. Ne. R.R., Inc., 277
Ga. at 246, 587 S.E.2d at 644).

2007]

ZONING & LAND USE

515

properties back to their pre-flood market value because of the stigma of
being located in a flood prone area.177
The plaintiffs relied on the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Mabry 178 to support their argument. In Mabry the
two plaintiffs, who were automobile insurance policy owners, sought, in
addition to the cost of repair, payment for the diminution in value of
their automobiles under the theory that a damaged vehicle will suffer a
diminution in value regardless of the efficacy of the repairs. 179 Though
intimating that it believed applying the rule of Mabry was logical, the
Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that "the rule applied by [the
Georgia] Supreme Court in Lusk remains in place and applies to cases
such as this."8 ' It appears that in referring to "cases such as this,"
the court was intending to differentiate cases concerning damage to real
property and cases concerning damage to personal property.
B.

Public Nuisance and the Free Public Services Doctrine

Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory was one of a multitude of
actions emanating from the Tri-State Crematory saga. Walker County
filed a suit for negligence and public nuisance against the owners and
operators of the crematorium and the funeral homes and funeral
directors who sent human remains to the crematory. The County sought
to recover the expenses it incurred in recovering, identifying, and
properly disposing of the human remains discovered at the crematorium
property. The County also sought an award of punitive damages and
attorney fees.8 2 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the County's complaint on the8 ground
that its claims
3
were barred by the free public services doctrine.
Under the free public services doctrine, "absent specific statutory
authorization or damage to government-owned property, a county cannot
recover the costs of carrying out public services from a tortfeasor whose
conduct caused the need for the services."8 4 Because the County had
neither pointed to a statute authorizing the recovery of its costs nor

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114 (2001).
Id. at 498, 556 S.E.2d at 116.
Broadnax, 285 Ga. App. at 439, 646 S.E.2d at 287 (emphasis added).
284 Ga. App. 34, 643 S.E.2d 324 (2007).
Id. at 34, 643 S.E.2d at 325-26.
Id. at 35, 643 S.E.2d at 326.
Id. at 37, 643 S.E.2d at 327.
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showed that it was seeking to recover costs associated with injury to its
85
own property, the court held that the County's claims were barred.
C. Proof of Defendant's Control Over Cause of Harm Element of
Nuisance Claim

In Grinold v. Farist,88 a slip-and-fall case, the plaintiff was injured
when he fell after inspecting a camper that the defendant Farist had
advertised for sale. The camper was parked on a driveway located on
Farist's aunt's property. The plaintiff purportedly fell as a result of
discharge from a clothes washer and kitchen sink that drained into the
aunt's yard.' 87 The plaintiff sued Farist and his aunt on the grounds
that the defendants
maintained a hazardous condition that constituted
88
a nuisance.

The trial court granted Farist's motion for summary judgment, and the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.' 9 The court of appeals concluded
that "'the essential element of nuisance is control over the cause of the
harm." ' 190 Because the plaintiff's injury occurred on property owned
by Farist's aunt, and the alleged nuisance was composed of discharge
from the aunt's house, the court held that Farist did not have control
over the cause of harm.' 91
D. Advisory Jury in Action to Enjoin Nuisance Case

In Knott v. Evans,'92 the plaintiff property owners filed a nuisance
action against the defendants, seeking to enjoin the defendants' use of
their property as a motocross track. The trial court chose to empanel a
jury as an aid in fact finding. The evidence showed that the defendants'
motocross facilities were open to the public from August 2002 to May
2003 and that the defendants chose to close the track to the public in
June 2003. The jury returned a special verdict that the defendants'
operation of a public motocross track on their property between August
2002 and May 2003 was a nuisance but that the defendants' operation
193
of motorcycles on their property since June 2003 was not a nuisance.

185. Id. at 37-38, 643 S.E.2d at 327-28.
186. 284 Ga. App. 120, 643 S.E.2d 253 (2007).
187. Id. at 122, 643 S.E.2d at 254.
188. Id. at 121-22, 643 S.E.2d at 254.
189. Id. at 122, 643 S.E.2d at 255.

190. Id. (quoting Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 239 Ga. App. 362, 366, 522 S.E.2d 13, 16
(1999)).
191. Id. at 122-23, 643 S.E.2d at 255.
192. 280 Ga. 515, 630 S.E.2d 402 (2006).
193.

Id. at 515 & n.1, 630 S.E.2d at 403 & n.1.
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The jury awarded no damages and declined to request that the court
structure guidelines for the future operation of the track. Nevertheless,
the trial court entered an order that expressly referenced the jury's
verdict but permanently enjoined the defendants' use of the track except
for specified days and times.'94 The trial court's order provided that
the day and time restrictions would "'run with the land.'" ' 95
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court considered the propriety of the
trial court's order.'96 The court concluded that although there is no
right to a jury trial in equity cases, the trial court may empanel a jury
if "'it desires to seek a jury's aid as a fact finding body."" 97 Where a
jury acts in an advisory role, the trial court is not bound by the jury's
Instead, the trial court maintains the authority to
factual findings.'
assess the facts independently from the jury.'99 However, where the
trial court acknowledges the jury's special verdict without any reservation or expression of dissatisfaction and makes no contrary factual
findings, the trial court commits error by rendering a ruling "completely
at odds with" the jury's factual findings."' Accordingly, because the
facts found by the jury and implicitly accepted by the trial court did not
support the imposition of the permanent injunction, the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of injunctive relief.2"'
Additionally, the court held that inasmuch as an injunction is an
equitable remedy and a court of equity acts in personam and not in rem,
court erred by providing that its order would "'run with the
the trial
20 2
land."'
E.

Acrual of Trespass Cause of Action

In Ceasar v.Shelton Land Co.,203 the plaintiffs sued a developer for
trespass, alleging that the developer desecrated and destroyed the
plaintiffs' family cemetery. The trial court granted summary judgment
to the developer on several grounds, including the running of the statute
of limitations and the plaintiffs' failure to prove sufficiently the legal

194.

Id. at 515, 630 S.E.2d at 403.

195. Id.
196. Id. at 515-17, 630 S.E.2d at 403-04.
197. Id. at 515, 630 S.E.2d at 403-04 (quoting Guhl v. Davis, 242 Ga. 356, 358, 249
S.E.2d 43, 45 (1978)).

198.
S.E.2d
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 515-16, 630 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Bagley v. Robertson, 265 Ga. 144, 145, 454
478, 480 (1995)).
Id.
Id. at 516, 630 S.E.2d at 404.
Id.
Id.
285 Ga. App. 421, 646 S.E.2d 689 (2007).

518

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

description for the boundaries of the cemetery.2" 4 The Georgia Court
of Appeals reversed." 5 With respect to the four-year statute of
limitations for trespass actions, the court noted that the developer's first
intrusion into the cemetery occurred more than four years before the suit
was filed.2" 6 The court held, however, that the action was not timebarred because "all evidence of the cemetery was not destroyed until the
land was bulldozed for cultivation in 1999," which was within the fouryear period before the suit was filed.20 7 Turning to the sufficiency of
the plaintiffs' legal description of the cemetery, the court noted that the
record showed that the location of the cemetery was generally known
and that there was some evidence of its location in the form of an aerial
map.20 8 This was true despite the fact that the fence and trees that
formerly established its boundaries had been destroyed.0 9
F

Intrusion of Lateral Support Measures a Trespass
In MVP Investment Co. v. North Fulton Express Oil, LLC,210 a
property owner brought an ejectment action against an adjoining
property owner who constructed an earthen slope and wall that
encroached upon the plaintiff's land. The purpose of the slope and wall
was to laterally support the defendant's land on the common boundary
line. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. 1
In analyzing whether the plaintiff was entitled to an order of ejectment,
the Georgia Court of Appeals cited Navajo Construction, Inc. v.
Brigham212 and Wachstein v. Christopher.213 From these cases, the
court determined that the law is well settled that a property owner is
entitled to an order of ejectment where a "permanent structure"
unlawfully encroaches onto the property owner's land. 214 The court
saw no reason "why an earthen slope that is required to provide lateral
support does not constitute a 'structure' under Wachstein or Navajo
Const[ruction]
when it encroaches upon the property of an adjacent
215
landowner."

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 422, 646 S.E.2d at 690.
Id. at 424, 646 S.E.2d at 691.
Id. at 423-24, 646 S.E.2d at 691.
Id.
Id. at 424, 646 S.E.2d at 691.
Id.
282 Ga. App. 512, 639 S.E.2d 533 (2006).
Id. at 512, 639 S.E.2d at 533-34.
271 Ga. App. 128, 608 S.E.2d 732 (2004).
128 Ga. 229, 57 S.E.2d 511 (1907).
MVP Inv. Co., 282 Ga. App. at 513-14, 639 S.E.2d at 534-35.
Id. at 514, 639 S.E.2d at 535.
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EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

During the survey period, the appellate courts had several opportuni216
ties to explore the application of O.C.G.A. section 44-9-40(b), authorizing a trial court to condemn private ways of necessity. The courts
also addressed the extent to which a servient tenement holder may
interfere with the easement rights of a dominant holder, an easement
grantor's right to refuse an easement holder's request to transfer its
rights to a third part, and the manner in which a license may ripen into
an irrevocable easement. In the context of restrictive covenants, the
courts construed ambiguous covenant terms, and addressed the impact
of restrictive covenants on a homeowner's right to sue for personal
injury.
A.

Easement by Necessity and PrivateRights-of-Way

1. Possession of Usufruct Insufficient Interest to Support
Condemnation of Private Way. Under O.C.G.A. section 44-9-40(b),
a trial court may condemn a private way or easement by necessity over
the land of another when a plaintiff "owns real estate or any interest
therein" to which the plaintiff has no means of access, ingress, and
egress.2 17 In Read v. Georgia Power Co.,218 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that possession of a mere usufruct does not constitute the
ownership of an interest in real property necessary to seek condemnation
219
of a private way under the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 44-9-40(b).
In Read the plaintiff leased property from Georgia Power under a
fifteen-year agreement. The lease agreement expressly provided that no
estate would pass between Georgia Power and Read and that Read
would have a usufruct only. Read's leased property was landlocked on
two sides and bounded by Lake Rabun on two sides. After Georgia
Power denied Read permission to build a driveway from his leased
property to the main road, Read filed a complaint against Georgia Power
an easement by necessity pursuant to
and adjacent lessees, seeking
220
O.C.G.A. section 44-9-40(b).
The trial court granted summary judgment to Georgia Power and the
adjacent lessees on the grounds that Read lacked a sufficient ownership
interest in his leased property to entitle him to seek an easement by

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

O.C.G.A. § 44-9-40(b) (2002).
Id.
283 Ga. App. 451, 641 S.E.2d 680 (2007).
Id. at 452-53, 641 S.E.2d at 681.
Id. at 451-52, 641 S.E.2d at 680-81.
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necessity."' In affirming the trial court, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that ordinarily the leasing of real estate for a period of less than
five years conveys only a usufruct unless the lease contract provides
otherwise.2 22 The lease contract between Read and Georgia Power
contemplated a term of fifteen years, raising the presumption that
Georgia Power conveyed an estate for years. However, the lease contract
expressly provided that notwithstanding the term, the lease created a
usufruct only.223 Thus, because Georgia Power conveyed no property
interest to Read, he did not "own" an "interest" in the leased property
and therefore was not entitled
to pursue an easement by necessity under
224
O.C.G.A. section 44-9-40(b).
2. Proof That Only Means of Access by Way of Navigable
Waters Sufficient to Establish Prima Facie Case of Necessity. In
Pierce v. Wise,225 the plaintiff sought to condemn a private way of
necessity over adjacent property owners' lands. The plaintiff owned a
triangular 0.40-acre lot located in a subdivision on Lake Lanier." 6
The tip of the plaintiff's lot touched the adjacent public roadway at a
point so narrow that it did not allow him to access the roadway without
crossing the land of either of his adjacent neighbors. 227 The plaintiff's
only means of vehicular access was by parking along the roadway and
walking 650 to 700 feet along an Army Corps of Engineers path abutting
the shore of Lake Lanier. The plaintiff could also access his lot via the
water. The trial court denied the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment and the case proceeded to a jury trial. After the jury found
that the plaintiff had a means of access to his property (presumably, by
water, though the opinion does not say), the trial court entered judgment
for the defendants.228
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. 229 The court noted that as
a prerequisite to relief under O.C.G.A. section 44-9-40(b), a plaintiff
must show that he or she has no other reasonable means of access to his
or her property. 20 The court further noted that the Georgia Supreme
Court previously addressed whether, under the statute, navigable waters

221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 452, 641 S.E.2d at 681.
Id. at 453, 641 S.E.2d at 681.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

225. 282 Ga. App. 709, 639 S.E.2d 348 (2006).
226.

Id. at 709-10, 639 S.E.2d at 349.

227. Id. at 710, 639 S.E.2d at 349.
228. Id. at 709-10, 639 S.E.2d at 349.
229. Id. at 709, 639 S.E.2d at 349.
230.

Id. at 710-11, 639 S.E.2d at 350.
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alone may afford a person "reasonable" access to his or her property.23 1
The court of appeals restated the supreme court's holding that where a
property owner has no access to his or her property other than by
navigable waterway, a presumption arises that there is no reasonable
means of access for purposes of proving necessity under O.C.G.A. section
44-9-40(b). 2 Thus, where a plaintiff establishes that the only access
to his or her property is by way of navigable waters, the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case that there is no reasonable means of
access. 233 "'The burden then shifts to the condemnee to go forward
with the evidence and demonstrate that access to the navigable waters
constitutes a reasonable means of access under the peculiar circumstances of the case.' 23 4 Concluding that the defendant failed to rebut the
presumption that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable means of access, the
court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment and motion for directed verdict.235
3. Private Way by Prescription and Proper Venue in Private
Way/Trespass Case. In Norton v. Holcomb,23 6 a property owner sued
the defendant for willful trespass, alleging that the defendant "unlawfully and intentionally carved out a road and knocked down trees" on the
plaintiff's property. 237 The defendant filed a counterclaim seeking to
quiet title and seeking condemnation of a private way, and the
defendant moved to transfer the action to Pickens County because the
case concerned title to land in that county. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff on both the trespass claim
and the
2 38
defendant's counterclaim and denied the motion to transfer.
The defendant appealed and enumerated as error the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on the grounds that the
defendant had acquired a private way by prescription over the roadway
at issue. The defendant based his alleged prescriptive easement on the
fact that the defendant's predecessor in interest had used the road as a

231.
232.
(1986)).
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 711, 639 S.E.2d at 350.
Id. (citing Int'l Paper Realty Corp. v. Miller, 255 Ga. 676, 678, 341 S.E.2d 445, 446
Id.
Id. (quoting Int'l Paper, 255 Ga. at 678, 341 S.E.2d at 446).
Id. at 712, 639 S.E.2d at 351.
285 Ga. App. 78, 646 S.E.2d 94 (2007).
Id. at 78, 646 S.E.2d at 96.
Id.
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means of access since 1883.239 The court of appeals noted that in order
to establish the existence of a private way, the defendant had to show:
(1) that he, or a predecessor in title, has been in uninterrupted use of
the alleged private way for at least twenty years; (2) that the private
way is no more than twenty feet wide, and that it is the same twenty
feet originally appropriated; and (3) that he has kept the private way
in repair during the period of uninterrupted use.24 °
The court held that the defendant failed to tender evidence that he or
his predecessor in title had been in uninterrupted use of the roadway for
at least twenty years.2 41 The defendant presented evidence from which
one could infer that someone continued to use the road, "[blut the law
requires that the use be by the person claiming the private way or by his
predecessor(s) in interest." 24 2 As such, neither the defendant nor his
predecessor in interest acquired a private way by prescription over the
plaintiff's land.2 43
The Georgia Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court's denial of
the defendant's motion to transfer.24 The court noted that the Georgia
constitution demands that "[a] suit involving title to land shall be
brought in the county where the land lies." 24" That mandate "does not
apply, however, where the title is incidentally involved only, and is not
directly put in issue."2 46 The court reasoned that an action for trespass
does not involve title to land, and because the defendant's claim of
prescriptive private way was incidental to the plaintiff's trespass claim,
the suit was properly brought in the county of the defendant's residence.247
B.

Interference with Rights to Use Easement

In Williams v. Trammell,24 the plaintiff's property benefited from
an express easement of ingress and egress over the adjacent property
owned by the defendant. The defendant obstructed the plaintiff's use of
the easement by installing one gate at the entrance to the easement

239.
240.
(2002)).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 80-81, 646 S.E.2d at 98.
Id. at 81 (citing Moody v. Degges, 258 Ga. App. 135, 137, 573 S.E.2d 93, 95
Id. at 83, 646 S.E.2d at 99.
Id., 646 S.E.2d at 100.
Id. at 84, 646 S.E.2d at 100.
Id. at 86, 646 S.E.2d at 102.
Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 2).
Id. (citing Anderson v. Black, 191 Ga. 627, 631, 13 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1941)).
Id. at 86-87, 646 S.E.2d at 102.
281 Ga. App. 590, 636 S.E.2d 757 (2006).

2007]

ZONING & LAND USE

523

from the public road and another midway along the easement. The
defendant admitted to installing the gates but alleged that he provided
the plaintiff with keys to the gates.249
The trial court found that the middle gate was an improper obstruction and ordered the defendant to remove it. The trial court concluded,
however, that with respect to the gate at the road, a fact question
existed regarding whether the gate was erected prior to or subsequent
to the plaintiff's acquisition of her land. The plaintiff appealed that
order.250
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
focusing on whether the front gate was installed prior to the plaintiff's
acquisition of her property.251 The trial court concerned itself with the
timing of the fence installation based on the authority of Harvey v.
252
Hightower,
which held that an obstruction arising after the grant of
an easement is improper.5 3 The trial court reasoned by implication
that an obstruction erected before the grant of the easement could limit
the scope of the easement granted. 254 The Georgia Court of Appeals
distinguished the current case from Harvey on the grounds that it was
undisputed in Harvey that no obstruction existed at the time the
easement was granted.255 Inasmuch as the evidence was conflicting
regarding whether installation of the front gate predated the plaintiff's
acquisition of her property, the court turned to the language of the
defendant's deed.2 6 Because the easement was purely "a creature of
the deed," and the description of the easement in the deed did not
provide for gates or other obstructions, the court held that both gates
constituted unauthorized obstructions and that the trial court erred in
not requiring the defendant to remove both gates.257
C. License Ripening into Easement
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 44-9-4 ,25

249. Id. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 758.
250. Id. at 591, 636 S.E.2d at 758.
251. Id. at 591-92, 636 S.E.2d at 759.
252. 239 Ga. App. 684, 521 S.E.2d 367 (1999).
253. Williams, 281 Ga. App. at 591, 636 S.E.2d at 759 (citing Harvey, 239 Ga. App. at
684, 521 S.E.2d at 367-68).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 591-92, 636 S.E.2d at 759.
257. Id. at 592, 636 S.E.2d at 759.
258. O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 (2002).
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A parol license to use another's land is revocable at any time if its
revocation does no harm to the person to whom it has been granted.
A parol license is not revocable when the licensee has acted pursuant
thereto and in so doing has incurred expense; in such case, it becomes
an easement running with the land.259
The Georgia Supreme Court has long held that qualifying expenses, for
the purposes of O.C.G.A. section 44-9-4, are those incurred to make
valuable improvements to the licensor's property that are necessary for
the enjoyment of the license.26 °
In Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Garrison Ridge Shopping Center
Marietta, GA, L.P.,261 the Georgia Court of Appeals had to determine
whether Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.'s ("Lowe's") license in a monument
sign had ripened into an irrevocable easement.2 62 The court held that
it had and enjoined defendant's interference therewith. 263 The facts
showed that a commercial property owner leased one parcel to Lowe's
and the remainder of the property to Garrison Ridge Shopping Center
("Garrison Ridge"). After learning that Cobb County authorities would
allow only one sign, the property owner wrote a letter to Lowe's and
Garrison Ridge, stating that if Lowe's agreed to pay one-half of the cost,
the owner would build a monument sign advertising both Lowe's and
Garrison Ridge tenants on the property leased to Garrison Ridge.
Lowe's paid $22,000, and the sign was built. A declaration of covenants
and easements was developed and recorded for the shopping center
property, though no reference to the Lowe's sign was made therein.
Years later, Garrison Ridge acquired the shopping center property, and
after discovering that no easement had ever been recorded governing the
sign, proposed a lease of $1300 a month to Lowe's for its continued use.
When Lowe's refused, Garrison Ridge indicated that it would remove the
Lowe's name from the sign. Lowe's sought injunctive relief. The trial
court granted Lowe's motion for a temporary restraining order but
denied its request for a preliminary injunction, and Lowe's appealed.2"

259. Id.
260. See Tift v. Golden Hardware Co., 204 Ga. 654, 668, 51 S.E.2d 435, 443-44 (1949)
(holding that there was no easement where the licensee built a warehouse on his own
property but did not make any improvements to a spur track on the licensor's property);
Miller v. Slater, 182 Ga. 552, 558, 186 S.E. 413, 416 (1936) (holding that there was no
easement where the licensee built a garage on her own property but did not make any
improvements to a driveway on the licensor's property).
261. 283 Ga. App. 854, 643 S.E.2d 288 (2007).
262. Id. at 854, 643 S.E.2d at 289.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 854-55, 643 S.E.2d at 289.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Garrison Ridge's
predecessor-in-interest granted Lowe's a license to construct a sign on its
property and that Lowe's incurred expense in doing so, resulting in the
ripening of its license into an irrevocable easement. 265 The court
further held that the Lowe's easement was binding on Garrison Ridge,
as a subsequent purchaser, because it "had actual notice of the sign
sufficient to charge it as a matter of law with a duty to conduct a
reasonable and prudent investigation."2 6 The court additionally noted
that the fact that Lowe's was a tenant rather than the owner of the
property it occupied had no bearing on Lowe's property rights.2 67
D. Discretion to Authorize Assignment of Easement Subject to
Implied Duty of Good Faith
In Hunting Aircraft, Inc. v. Peachtree City Airport Authority,26 8
Hunting Aircraft, Inc., an aviation maintenance facility, sought a
declaration that a contract between itself and the Peachtree City Airport
Authority (the "Authority") contained an implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing. The facts showed that the Authority conveyed a nonexclusive access easement to Hunting Aircaft to move aircraft from its
property across the airport's boundary and onto the airport's runways
and taxiways. The contract provided that the Authority could declare
a default and terminate the agreement if Hunting Aircraft sold or
assigned its real property interests or its easement rights without first
securing the written consent of the Authority. In 2005 Hunting Aircraft
entered into an agreement to sell its property and to assign its easement
rights to a prospective purchaser. Hunting Aircraft requested that the
Authority consent to the transaction, but the Authority refused.269
The trial court declared that the easement did not require the
Authority to act reasonably when considering a request for the
assignment of rights conferred by the agreement.
On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that in Brack v. Brownlee27 1 the
Georgia Supreme Court held that "'[elvery contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 855, 643 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 857, 643 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 855, 643 S.E.2d at 290.
281 Ga. App. 450, 636 S.E.2d 139 (2006).
Id. at 450-51, 636 S.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 451, 636 S.E.2d at 140.
246 Ga. 818, 273 S.E.2d 390 (1980).
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enforcement.' 27 2 The court also noted that, in applying the rule,
Georgia appellate courts require that "'where the manner of performance
is left more or less to the discretion of one of the parties to the contract,
[that party] is bound to the exercise of good faith. ''2 7 3 Applying that
rule, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the easement
agreement allowed the Authority to exercise its discretion in determining
whether to grant its consent to an assignmentY.4 As such, the Authority was subject to an implied obligation that such discretion be exercised
in good faith. 2 5 Relying on three Georgia Court of Appeals cases, the
Authority argued that the "good faith and fair dealing" rule did not
2 77
In Tap Room, Inc. v. Peachtree-TSG Associates, LLC
apply.276
Vaswani v. Wohletz,278 and Nguyen v. Manley,7 9 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that "in the context of a lease, no requirement of reasonableness was implied to constrict a landlord's discretion whether to
consent to the assignment of a lease or to consent to structural
alterations to the leased property.""' The court, however, "decline[d]
to enlarge this exception so as to apply it to nonleasehold contracts,"
reasoning that to do so would create an exception that swallowed the
rule.281 The court of appeals held that "the trial court erred in its legal
conclusion that the duty of good faith did not apply to the Authority's
282
decision to withhold its consent to the proposed transaction.
E.

Restrictive Covenants

In Skylake Property Owners Ass'n v. Powell,8 3 the plaintiffs sought
to enjoin their property owners association from stopping the construction of their home. The association counterclaimed, contending that the

272. Id., 636 S.E.2d at 141 (brackets in original) (quoting Brack, 246 Ga. at 820, 273
S.E.2d at 392).
273. Id. at 452, 636 S.E.2d at 141 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Camp v. Peetluk, 262
Ga. App. 345, 350, 585 S.E.2d 704, 708 (2003)).
274. Id.
275. Id. (quoting Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., 245 Ga. App. 334, 345,
537 S.E.2d 397,409 (2000), vacated and remanded, 534 U.S. 801 (2001), reinstated,254 Ga.
App. 598, 563 S.E.2d 178 (2002)).
276. Id. at 453, 636 S.E.2d at 141-42.
277. 270 Ga. App. 90, 606 S.E.2d 13 (2004).
278. 196 Ga. App. 676, 396 S.E.2d 593 (1990).
279. 185 Ga. App. 187, 363 S.E.2d 613 (1987).
280. Hunting Aircraft, 281 Ga. App. at 454, 636 S.E.2d at 142 (citing Tap Room, 270
Ga. App. at 91, 606 S.E.2d at 15; Vaswani, 196 Ga. App. at 676-77, 396 S.E.2d at 594;
Nguyen, 185 Ga. App. at 187, 363 S.E.2d at 614).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 281 Ga. App. 715, 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006).

2007]

ZONING & LAND USE

527

plaintiffs failed to obtain approval to build a retaining wall on their
property. The trial court found that the applicable restrictive covenants
did not prohibit the construction of a retaining wall within a setback line
because the retaining wall did not constitute a "structure" under the
covenants. 8 4
On appeal, in construing the covenants, the Georgia Court of Appeals
ruled that the term "structure" was not defined in the covenants and
that the covenants were ambiguous regarding whether a retaining wall
could be built within the twenty-foot setback.8 ' As such, the court
26
applied the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Applying the rule that "'[w]ords generally bear their usual and common
signification,'" the court reasoned that a retaining wall certainly fell
within the scope of the term "structure" as defined in Black's Law
Dictionary.287 However, the court noted that using this definition, a
driveway, a sewer line, and a sprinkler system, by their very nature,
would all be required to cross setback lines and thus constitute
structures. 28 8 Displeased with the application of the first rule of
contract construction, the court turned to the rule that the whole
contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any
part. 289 After reviewing the covenants in their entirety, the court
concluded that structure was "used in a limited sense to refer to a house,
building, dwelling, or any above-ground or 'erected' shelters for people
or property."2'
Accordingly, the court held that the term structure
291
was not intended to be broad enough to encompass a retaining wall.
Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary
judgment to the defendant property owners. 2
In Hayes v. Lakeside Village Owners Ass'n,293 property owners who
were members of the Lakeside Village Owners Association, Inc. (the
"Association") brought a personal injury action against the Association
for injuries to Hayes, one of the plaintiffs, resulting from the collapse of
a common area chair. The plaintiffs alleged negligence and gross

284. Id. at 715-16, 637 S.E.2d at 52-53.
285. Id. at 716, 637 S.E.2d at 53 (citing Mitchell v. Cambridge Prop. Owners Ass'n, 276
Ga. App. 326, 326-27, 623 S.E.2d 511, 512 (2005)).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 717, 637 S.E.2d at 53 (brackets in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(2)
(1982)) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1464 (8th ed. 2004)).
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4)).
290. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 54.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 282 Ga. App. 866, 640 S.E.2d 373 (2006).
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negligence on the part of the Association for failing to properly maintain
the chair. The Association moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the plaintiffs were bound by a restrictive covenant that (1) absolved
the association from liability resulting from injuries occurring on the
common property, (2) assigned the property owners a duty to continuously inspect the common areas, and (3) provided that the property owners
use the facilities at their own risk. The trial court granted the
Association's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed.2 94
The plaintiffs contended that they were not bound by the restrictive
covenant because it was a collateral or personal covenant that did not
run with the land and bind them as subsequent assignees. 295 The
Georgia Court of Appeals, however, noted that the Georgia Supreme
Court relaxed the rules governing covenants relating to land and that
the supreme court frequently enforced such restrictions against
subsequent grantees with notice, "'whether named in the instrument or
not, and though there [was] no privity of estate."'296 Rather,
"It is immaterial in such cases whether the covenant runs with the
land or not, the general rule being that it will be enforced according to
the intention of the parties. It is only necessary that the covenant
concern
the land or its use, and that the subsequent grantee has notice
29 7
of it."

Determining that the plaintiffs had notice of the covenant through the
reference in their deed and that the covenant "concern[ed] the land or its
use," the court held that the covenant was enforceable against the
plaintiffs and that the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the
Association was proper.298
IV. ZONING
In the area of zoning, the Georgia Supreme Court heard several cases
and reached several conclusions. For example, the supreme court held
that a land owner's right to develop property under a certain zoning
category is not transferrable to subsequent purchasers. Additionally, the

294. Id. at 866-67, 640 S.E.2d at 375.
295. Id. at 867, 640 S.E.2d at 375.
296. Id. at 867,640 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting Lowry v. Norris Lake Shores Dev. Corp., 231
Ga. 549, 551, 203 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1974)).
297. Id. at 867-68, 640 S.E.2d at 375 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lowry, 231 Ga. at
551, 203 S.E.2d at 172).
298. Id. at 869, 640 S.E.2d at 376 (citing Lowry, 231 Ga. at 551, 203 S.E.2d at 172).
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court decided that traffic impacts present a rational basis to deny a
conditional use permit.
A.

Vested Rights to Develop Property Not Transferable with Land

In BBC Land & Development, Inc. v. Butts County,"' two developers
bought property in Butts County. Each property was zoned R-1-C,
which permitted construction of homes with a minimum of 1500 square
feet. Both developers submitted plans showing housing of that size,
which the County approved. The County later amended its zoning
ordinance to require a minimum house size of 2000 square feet in the R1-C zoning classification. The developers subsequently sold lots to
builders. When those builders submitted applications for building
permits, they were denied on the ground that the planned houses did not
meet the 2000 square foot limit of the R-1-C zoning classification. In
response, the developers and the builder sued Butts County seeking
injunctive relief, mandamus, a declaratory judgment, and damages. In
their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that a land owner's vested right
to develop land in accordance with previous zoning attaches to the land
and benefits a subsequent purchaser. In support of this argument, the
plaintiffs claimed that vested rights are analogous to nonconforming
uses. The trial court found for the County. ° ° On review, the Georgia
In doing so, the court distinguished
Supreme Court affirmed.0 1
nonconforming uses from vested rights, concluding,
[B]ased on the difference between nonconforming uses and vested
rights to develop property in accordance with prior zoning, and
especially on the nature of the vested rights as a property interest of
the owner of the property, earned by the owner's substantial change of
position in relation to the land, substantial expenditures, or incurring
of substantial obligations, that vested rights to develop property in
accordance with prior zoning are personal to the owner of them and are
not transferable with the land.30 2
B.

Landfill Not "PublicUtility"

In EarthResources,LLC v. Morgan County,30 3 EarthResources, LLC
bought property in Morgan County zoned for agricultural use.30 4 It
then sought written verification of zoning compliance in order to pursue

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

281 Ga. 472, 640 S.E.2d 33 (2007).
Id. at 472-73, 640 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 474, 640 S.E.2d at 35.
Id.
281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006).
Id. at 396, 638 S.E.2d at 326-27.
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a state permit to build a landfill." 5 EarthResources claimed its plans
met zoning requirements "because its landfill would be a public utility
and public utility structures were permitted uses under the 1997 zoning
ordinance then in effect."30 6 After the County refused to certify that
the landfill was a permitted use, EarthResources filed suit. Later, the
County filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted.0 7 Among several topics of discussion, the trial court considered EarthResources' "claim that its landfill would be a public utility
and the provision in the zoning ordinance in effect when this case began
that public utility structures were permitted uses in areas zoned for
agriculture." 30 8 The court turned first to the County's zoning ordinance, which defined public utilities as follows: "'Entities engaged in
regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service which is
of public consequence or need, regulated and controlled by a state or
federal regulatory
commission and which may have the power of eminent
30 9
domain."'
The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that EarthResources could not
meet this definition, stating,
[Although the] proposed landfill would provide a needed public service,
the landfill still fails to meet an essential part of the definition, that it
be "regulated and controlled by a state or federal regulatory commission." In considering the authority to regulate public utilities, this
Court has held that "the Public Service Commission, rather than any
other agency of the executive branch, has authority to regulate public
utilities." That holding alone is sufficient to exclude the Department
of Natural Resources from the role of a state regulatory commission
regulating and controlling public utilities and, therefore, to exclude
EarthResources' landfill from the category of public utility.31 °
The court also made an interesting comment on the plaintiff's Open
Meetings Act311 challenge. First, it cited the provision relative to
publication of the agenda:
"Prior to any meeting, the agency holding such meeting shall make
available an agenda of all matters expected to come before the agency
at such meeting. The agenda shall be available upon request and shall

305.
306.

Id., 638 S.E.2d at 327.
Id.

307. Id.
308. Id. at 397, 638 S.E.2d at 327.
309. Id.
310. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Lasseter v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227,
230, 319 S.E.2d 824, 827-28 (1984)).
311. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2006).
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be posted at the meeting site, as far in advance of the meeting as
reasonably possible."312
The court then concluded that the agenda was not properly posted.
Despite this conclusion, the court held that:

13

Although the failure to post the agenda at the alternate site constituted
a technical violation of the statute, we do not construe the statute so
tightly as to consider the failure to comply with the letter of the agenda
provision to require invalidation of the decision adverse to EarthResources. The Open Meetings Act "was enacted in the public interest to
protect the public-both individuals and the public generally-from
'closed door' politics and the potential abuse of individuals and the
misuse of power such policies entail. Therefore, the Act must314 be
broadly construed to effect its remedial and protective purposes."
C.

Traffic Impact Sufficient to Deny Conditional Use Permit

In the City of Roswell v. Fellowship Christian School, Inc.,315 the
school applied for a conditional use permit to construct several new
buildings, including a football stadium. Despite opposition, the planning
commission recommended approval of the application. The city council
subsequently approved the permit, but without the stadium.3 16 The
school filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining that "the
decision to disallow the stadium was arbitrary, capricious, a gross abuse
of discretion and a violation of both federal and state guarantees of equal
'
protection."317
The trial court found in favor of the school, and the
City filed an appeal.3 '8
On review, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed:
Whether to approve or to deny that application was addressed solely
to the exercise of [the City's] sound discretion in accordance with the
factors enumerated in the ordinance. There was evidence to support
the decision to deny the Permit based upon the negative impact the
stadium would have on traffic in the area ....

312.
1(e)(1)).
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

EarthResources, 281 Ga. at 399, 638 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-14Id.
Id. (quoting Atlanta Journal v. Hill, 257 Ga. 398, 399,359 S.E.2d 913,914 (1987)).
281 Ga. 767, 642 S.E.2d 824 (2007).
Id. at 767, 642 S.E.2d at 825.
Id.
Id.
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• . . [Further,] evidence that [the] proposed stadium would exacer-

bate an already existing traffic problem in the area is a rational basis
for the denial of the application for the Permit. '1 9
D. Devisee of Real Property Has Standing Even Though Title Is
Inchoate
In Hollberg v. Spalding County,320 a property owner challenged the
grant of a special exception to an adjacent property owner to reduce the
minimum lot size permitted for a subdivision from two acres to one acre.
On April 22, 2004, the Spalding County Board of Commissioners (the
"Board") rezoned a 143-acre tract of land adjacent to that owned by the
plaintiff from AR-1 (Agricultural and Residential) to R-4 (Single-Family
Residential). At the zoning hearing, the plaintiff voiced objection to the
rezoning but did not appeal the County's action. Five months later, the
Board approved a special exception for the 143-acre tract to allow a
reduction in the minimum lot size from two acres to one acre. Within
thirty days of that decision, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the
grant of the special exception was void because it was based upon a
purportedly invalid rezoning decision. The defendants sought summary
judgment on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff's challenge was timebarred and (2) the plaintiff lacked standing. The defendants contended
that the plaintiff could not base its challenge to the special exception
grant on errors purported to have occurred during the rezoning of the
property because the plaintiff failed to appeal the rezoning decision
within thirty days, as required by the zoning ordinance. Also, the
defendants argued that the plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, satisfy
the "substantial interest-aggrieved citizen" test necessary to have
standing to challenge a zoning decision because the plaintiff did not own
his property at the time of the zoning decision. The trial court granted
the defendants' motions for summary judgment.3 21
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that notwithstanding his failure to
timely appeal the rezoning decision, he was entitled to a declaratory
judgment under the decision from Head v. DeKalb County.322 The
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that Head did not support the plaintiff's
position.123
In Head the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
regarding the effect of a board of commissioners vote on a rezoning (in

319. Id. at 769, 642 S.E.2d at 826.
320. 281 Ga. App. 768, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006).
321. Id. at 768-70, 637 S.E.2d at 165-67.
322. Id. at 770-71, 637 S.E.2d at 167 (citing Head v. DeKalb County, 246 Ga. App. 756,
760, 542 S.E.2d 176, 180 (2000)).
323. Id. at 771, 637 S.E.2d at 167.
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other words, whether the rezoning was approved or denied).3 24 Here,
the court noted that the effect of the Board's April 22, 2004 vote was
clear-the property was rezoned.3 25 The plaintiff was simply dissatisfied by that decision.1 6 As such, the court held that it was "incumbent
upon [the plaintiff] to file a timely appeal if he wished to challenge the
Board's decision on the merits." 27 The plaintiff's failure to do so
meant that he was foreclosed from raising alleged errors occurring in the
the property in his attack on the grant of the special
rezoning of
328
exception.
The court also held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the
Board's grant of a special exception. 29 To have standing to challenge
a zoning decision, a party must satisfy the substantial interest-aggrieved
citizen test.33 ° The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked a
substantial interest in the zoning decision because he did not own his
property at the time of the Board's decision. Rather, at the time of the
special exception hearing, the plaintiff was a devisee of the property
under his mother's will. 3 ' In a matter of first impression, the court
addressed the issue of "[w]hether a devisee of real property has a
substantial interest in a zoning decision so as to satisfy the first prong"
of the substantial interest-aggrieved citizen test. 332 Looking to the
probate rules for guidance, the court noted that the probate rules provide
that upon the death of the testator, "'devisees have an inchoate title in
the realty which is perfected when the executor assents to the devise.' 3 3 Additionally, such assent "'relates back to the date of death
of the testator.' ' 334 The court held, "Given the legally protected status
of inchoate title to real property, we hold that such title is sufficient to
give [the plaintiff] a 'substantial interest' in the grant of the special
However, because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
exception., 335
second prong of the substantial interest-aggrieved citizen test-showing

324. Id. (citing Head, 246 Ga. App. at 757, 542 S.E.2d at 178).
325. See id., 637 S.E.2d at 167-68.
326. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 168.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 775, 637 S.E.2d at 170.
330. Id. at 772, 637 S.E.2d at 168.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 772-73, 637 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 236 Ga. 133, 135,
223 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1976)).
334. Id. at 773, 637 S.E.2d at 168-69 (quoting Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 201, 223
S.E.2d 445, 448 (1976)).
335. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 169.
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special damages-he lacked standing to challenge the grant of the
special exception.33 6
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

This section mentions seven cases that share little, thematically
speaking, with the previously discussed topics, but cover issues still
within the broad spectrum of zoning and land use law.
A. Open Records Act: Attorney Fees; Exception for Trade Secrets;
and Electronic Data
In Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County, 37 Hall County appealed the
denial of its motion for summary judgment on an Open Records Act 338

request. The County had failed to respond to the request within three
business days and only made available one of the five categories of
information requested.33 9
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 50-18-70(f),34 ° once a request for review
of public records is submitted, the custodian of the records shall have no
more than three business days to determine whether or not the
requested records are subject to the statute or whether an exemption to
the statute applies. 4 ' The courts had previously interpreted the Act
to "'require an affirmative response to an open records request within
three business days. '' 342 If the records keeper fails to affirmatively
respond to the requester "'within three business days by notifying the
requesting party of the determination as to whether access will be
granted, the [Act] has been violated.' 34 3 In this case, the County
failed to meet the requirements of the Act. 3 "
Benefit Support, Inc. ("Benefit") sought attorney fees from the County
under O.C.G.A. section 50-18-73(b)34 5 for failure to comply with the
Open Records Act without substantial justification. 346 A two-prong
test is required to obtain attorney fees under the Open Records Act. 47

336. Id. at 775, 637 S.E.2d at 170.
337.

281 Ga. App. 825, 637 S.E.2d 763 (2006).

338.
339.
340.
341.

O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
Id. at 834, 637 S.E.2d at 772.
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(f) (2006).
Id.

342. Benefit Support, 281 Ga. App. at 833, 637 S.E.2d at 771 (quoting Wallace v.
Greene County, 274 Ga. App. 776, 783, 618 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2005)).

343. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting Wallace, 274 Ga. App. at 783, 618 S.E.2d at 649).
344. Id. at 834, 637 S.E.2d at 772.

345. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b) (2006).
346. Benefit Support, 281 Ga. App. at 834, 637 S.E.2d at 772.
347.

Id.
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First, the plaintiff must show that the records were not produced prior
to the lawsuit being filed. 48 Second, if there was a violation, the
plaintiff must show that the County lacked substantial justification for
the violation.349
The court held that the first prong was met because the County failed
to respond to the Open Records Act request within three business
days. 350 The second prong was met because the County did not bother

to produce the remaining documents until after the civil action was filed
and did not explain its dilatory conduct in any evidence submitted with
its motion for summary judgment.3 51 The court held that the trial
court did not err in denying the County's motion for summary judgment.3 52
In Douglas Asphalt Co. v. E.R. Snell Contractor, Inc. 353 Douglas
Asphalt Co. ("Douglas") filed an Open Records Act request to the Georgia
Department of Transportation (the "GDOT") for documents related to
bids for road paving projects. Snell and ten other asphalt contractors
brought an action against the GDOT seeking an injunction to prevent
the release of the documents. Snell and the other contractors alleged
that the documents contained trade secrets and as such fell under an
exemption to the Open Records Act. After a bench trial, the Superior
Court of Fulton County enjoined the GDOT from giving unredacted
copies of the documents to Douglas. Douglas appealed.354
O.C.G.A. section 50-18-72(b)(1) 3

5

provides an exception to the Open

Records Act to protect "'the confidentiality of trade secrets obtained from
a business entity that are confidential and required to be submitted to
a government agency.'" 356 The trial court found that profit margins
within the asphalt industry are very tight, running between one and five
percent. It further found that asphalt companies spend significant
resources in developing their asphalt formulas in order to reduce costs
and increase profits.35 7

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. (citing Wallace, 274 Ga. App. at 781, 618 S.E.2d at 647).
Id. (citing Wallace, 274 Ga. App. at 781, 618 S.E.2d at 648).
Id.
Id.
Id.
282 Ga. App. 546, 639 S.E.2d 372 (2006).
Id. at 546, 639 S.E.2d at 373.
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2007).
Douglas Asphalt Co., 282 Ga. App. at 548, 639 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting GEORGIA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) 2SP: CONTROL

OF SUPERPAVE BITUMINOUS MIXTURE DESIGNS II.E. (2003), availableat http://tomcat2.dot.state.ga.us/thesource/pdf/auxdata/sop/sop2sp.html).
357. Id. at 546, 639 S.E.2d at 373.
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As part of the bid process, the GDOT requires bidders to submit
proposed design mix formulas for the asphalt prior to bidding on a job.
The successful bidder must submit a "Job Mix Formula" that includes
the percentages and the sources of each material that is to be used in
the previously approved formula. The successful contractor is also
required to provide worksheets every day of the actual construction
reporting the results of tests that are run on the asphalt.358 The
Standard Operating Procedures of the GDOT Office of Materials and
Research states that "'[m]ix designs shall be made available only to the
designer and to users authorized by the designer. Mix designs are
considered to be proprietary information. They are not subject to public
disclosure under the Georgia Open Records Act by virtue of [O.C.G.A.
section] 50-18-72(b)(1). '' 359 Georgia law defines "trade secrets" as
follows:
"information, without regard to form, including, but not limited to,
technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a
program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a process,
financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual or
potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or
available to the public and which information:
(A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and
reasonable under the circum(B) Is the subject of efforts that36are
0
stances to maintain its secrecy."
The superior court found as a matter of law that the requested
documents were trade secrets and exempt from the Open Records Act
request under O.C.G.A. section 50-18-72(b)(1). Douglas contended that
the court erred, arguing that the information could not be a trade secret
because the roads were public property and the formula was ascertainable by testing. However, testimony established that the asphalt mix
could not be readily ascertained through tests and could not be
duplicated by independent research." 1 The court of appeals held that
even if all the information regarding the materials was publicly

358. Id. at 547, 639 S.E.2d at 373-74.
359. Id. at 548,639 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
supra note 356.
360. Id. at 549, 639 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4) (2000)).

361. Id. at 549-50, 639 S.E.2d at 375.
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available, a unique combination of that information could add value and
may qualify as a trade secret.362
Douglas further argued that because the contractor was not required
by law to enter into the contracts, the information was not "'required by
law."'36 3 The court pointed out that there was no Georgia case law
addressing the issue of whether the information required to be submitted
as part of a contract was actually information required by law. 64
However, federal courts have held that information that must be
submitted in conjunction with a government contract is required by
law.365 Applying the reasoning of the federal courts, the court of
appeals held that the requested information met the requirements of
O.C.G.A. section 50-18-72(b)(1) as an exemption to the Open Records
Act, and the judgment was affirmed.3"
3 67 the
In Georgia Department of Agriculture v. Griffin Industries,

plaintiff, Griffin Industries ("Griffin"), filed suit in Fulton County to
compel the Georgia Department of Agriculture (the "Department") to
comply with an Open Records Act request. 6 The plaintiff requested
"all departmental records relating to its Griffin facility's emissions and
odor issues" as well as additional documents. 69 In the request, the
term "'records"' was defined to include "'computer based or generated
information.' 370 The Department supplied the requested documents
but did not provide relevant email documents. Email files were not
archived, and the only source for the information was a series of
emergency computer backup tapes. To provide copies of the emails, it
would have been necessary for the Department to convert the emergency
backup tapes from computer language and then compile them through
a very laborious, expensive, and time intensive process.37 '
Griffin was not satisfied with the Department's response and
immediately moved for an interlocutory injunction or temporary
restraining order to prevent the Department from destroying the
requested information before the resolution of the matter. The presiding

362. Id. at 550, 639 S.E.2d at 375-76 (citing Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co.,
318 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003)).
363. Id. at 551, 639 S.E.2d at 376.
364. Id.

365. See TRIFID Corp. v. Nat'l Imagery & Mapping Agency, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1098
(E.D. Mo. 1998).
366.
367.
368.

Douglas Asphalt, 282 Ga. App. at 551, 639 S.E.2d at 377.
284 Ga. App. 259, 644 S.E.2d 286 (2007).
Id. at 260, 644 S.E.2d at 287.

369.
370.
371.

Id., 644 S.E.2d at 287-88.
Id., 644 S.E.2d at 288.
Id. at 260-61, 644 S.E.2d at 288.
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judge issued an order requiring the parties and counsel to appear at a
case management conference and prepare a case status report; the judge
also required the parties to discuss alternative dispute resolution.3 72
The court stated that it might rule on "'any small motions"' and that it
would enter a scheduling order following the conference.373
At the conference the court ordered the Department to "'preserve,
safeguard and not destroy all electronic data files and correspondence."'3 74 Griffin's motion for injunctive relief and the Department's
motion to quash were held to be moot." 5 The court further ordered
the Department to "'put the data on any and all backup tapes back into
the same document form or format that it was in prior to being backed
up, review those documents for privilege, or applicable exemptions as
provided for by [GORA] ... and then produce to Plaintiff all those
documents that are not either privileged or exempt.''376
The Georgia Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's ruling,
which granted full relief to Griffin.377 The court held that the Department was entitled to a hearing in order to present issues raised in its
filing. 37 8
The court cited O.C.G.A. section 9-11-54(c)(1),3 7 9 which
provides that "'the court shall not give the successful party relief, though
he may be entitled to it, where the propriety of the relief was not
litigated ... to assert defenses to such relief.'"3 11 Central issues raised
in the Department's filings included whether the tapes were within the
scope of the Open Records Act, the difficulty and cost of producing the
information, and which party was responsible for the cost of such
production.3 81 The court that while O.C.G.A. section 9-11-65382 allows for consolidation of a hearing for interlocutory injunction with the
trial on the merits, "'the trial court's discretion to consolidate is
tempered by the due process principle that fair notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given [to] the litigants before the disposition of

372. Id.
373. Id. at 261, 644 S.E.2d at 288.
374. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 289.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 261-62, 644 S.E.2d at 289 (alteration in original) (brackets in original).
377. Id. at 262, 644 S.E.2d at 289.
378. Id.
379. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(c)(1) (2006).
380. Griffin Industries, 284 Ga. App. at 262, 644 S.E.2d at 289 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 911-54(c)(1)).
381. Id.
382. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 (2006).
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'0 8 ' The decision
a case on the merits.'
of the superior court was thus
384

void and reversed.

B.

Local Government Ordinances and Regulations: Liquor License
In City of Atlanta v. Jones,"5 the defendants, managers of nightclubs, were held criminally liable in municipal court for the actions of
their bartenders, namely, selling alcohol without a license in violation
of a city ordinance. The Superior Court of Fulton County reversed the
convictions on the ground that the ordinance applies only to the
designated alcohol licensee, not the designee's employees. The City
appealed.38 6
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the ordinance, as written,
applies not only to the licensee but also to anyone who sells alcohol
without a license, including managers and employees." 7 However, the
court held that the manager's convictions were correctly set aside
because there was no evidence that the managers themselves were
selling alcohol. 88 The Georgia Supreme Court has consistently held
that "'vicarious criminal liability violates due process."'38 9 Therefore,
the managers could not be held liable for their bartenders' actions. 30
C. Sign Ordinance
In Coffey v. Fayette County ("Coffey IF,,),91 Coffey brought a constitutional challenge to a Fayette County sign ordinance, which restricted
noncommercial signs in residential areas to one sign per lot, where each

383. Griffin Industries, 284 Ga. App. at 263, 644 S.E.2d at 289 (quoting Kim v. State,
272 Ga. 343, 344, 528 S.E.2d 798, 799 (2000)).
384. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 290.
385. 283 Ga. App. 125, 640 S.E.2d 698 (2006).
386. Id. at 125, 640 S.E.2d at 700.
387. Id. at 127, 640 S.E.2d at 701 (citing Sapp v. State, 99 Ga. App. 657, 660, 109
S.E.2d 841, 843 (1959)).
388. Id.; see, e.g., O'Brien v. DeKalb County, 256 Ga. 757, 758-59, 353 S.E.2d 31, 32-33
(1987) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish responsibility and
authority as required for criminal prosecution under a regulatory ordinance). Compare
Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 530, 384 S.E.2d 631, 635 (1989) (upholding the
conviction of the owner of a wrecker service for violation of a city ordinance mandating
acceptance of checks and credit cards because evidence showed that the owner maintained
complete control over the policies of the corporation and personally refused to accept the
checks as required by the ordinance).
389. Jones, 283 Ga. App. at 127, 640 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Perkins v. State, 277 Ga.
323, 325, 588 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2003)).
390. Id.
391. 280 Ga. 656, 631 S.E.2d 703 (2006).
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sign may not exceed six square feet in area. The392
case came before the
Georgia Supreme Court twice on different issues.
In 1999 the Fayette County Superior Court initially denied the
applicant's motion for an interlocutory injunction, finding that "'there
[was] a rational relationship between the County's sign [ordinance] and
its interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.'"3' 93
On appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Coffey v. Fayette County ("Coffey /P).94 held
395
that the rational relationship test was not the correct standard.
According to the court, the Georgia constitution affords broader
protection than the First Amendment,396 requiring the least restrictive
means of achieving its goals to be adopted.397 The case was remanded
to superior court.398
On remand, the trial court found that a number of provisions in the
ordinance were unconstitutional "because they were not contentneutral."3 99 However, the trial court found that those provisions could
be severed without affecting the overall viability of the ordinance and
that this was the least restrictive means for the county to achieve its
goals of traffic safety and aesthetics. The trial court reached this ruling
despite the fact that it did not receive any evidence to support it. Coffey
appealed the decision to the Georgia Supreme Court.400
The supreme court concluded that it was not in the position to dispute
the county's conclusion that one sign, of the defined size, would
adequately promote traffic safety and was the only way to maintain its
aesthetic goals.4 ' However, in ordinances restricting free speech, the
court "'must review [the ordinance] closely to ensure that it is narrowly
drawn to serve the city's interest. '' 40 2 In this case, the superior court
deferred to the county's ordinance without receiving any evidence or
fully considering whether the ordinance was the least restrictive means

392. Id. at 656, 631 S.E.2d at 703.
393. Coffey v. Fayette County ("Coffey P), 279 Ga. 111, 111, 610 S.E.2d 41, 42 (2005).
394. 279 Ga. 111, 610 S.E.2d 41 (2005).
395. Id. at 112, 610 S.E.2d at 42.
396. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

397.

Coffey 1, 279 Ga. at 111, 610 S.E.2d at 42.

398.

Id.

399. Coffey 11, 280 Ga. at 657, 631 S.E.2d at 704.
400. Id. at 656-57, 631 S.E.2d at 703-04.
401. Id. at 657, 631 S.E.2d at 704.
402.

Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Statesboro Publ'g Co. v. City of Sylvania, 271

Ga. 92, 94, 516 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1999)).
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of achieving its goals.4" 3 As such, the court reversed the judgment of
04
the superior court and remanded with direction.
D. HOA Dispute: Res Judicata
In Green v. Board of Directors of Park Cliff Unit Owners Ass'n,4 °5 a
condominium owner, Green, brought an unsuccessful action against the
Park Cliff Condominium Association ("Park Cliff') in magistrate court
for damages arising from an alleged failure to maintain the condominium in accordance with the association's bylaws and standards.4 °6 A
magistrate judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant because the
plaintiff failed to prove a claim. The same day, Green filed a pro se
complaint in Fulton County Superior Court seeking an injunction
against the defendant and the repair of common areas of the condominium as required by its "Declaration of Condominium."0 7 Upon review,
the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the second complaint was barred
by res judicata.4 °s In order to bar a subsequent action based upon res
judicata, "'it must be established that an identity of parties and subject
matter exists between the two actions, and that a court of competent
jurisdiction entered an adjudication in the earlier action. ' ' 40 9 If the
merits of the second case were or could have been determined in the first
case, then the res judicata defense is valid. 4 0 The plaintiff conceded
that the parties were the same, and upon review of the evidence, the
court determined that the subject matter was the same.4 ' The court
further held that a claim for injunctive relief could have been asserted
against Park Cliff in the first case. 4 " The fact that the magistrate
court lacked equity jurisdiction was immaterial.41a
According to the
court, the applicants "'chose the forum
and
were
bound
by the limita' 41 4
tions of the court that they chose. '

403. Id. at 658, 631 S.E.2d at 704.
404. Id.
405. 279 Ga. App. 567, 631 S.E.2d 769 (2006).
406. Id. at 567, 631 S.E.2d at 770.
407. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 770-71.
408. Id. at 570, 631 S.E.2d at 772.
409. Id. at 569, 631 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting Mahan v. Watkins, 256 Ga. App. 260, 261,
568 S.E.2d 130, 131 (2002)).
410. Id. at 569-70,631 S.E.2d at 772 (citing Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 269
Ga. 109, 110, 498 S.E.2d 255, 256 (1998)).
411. Id. at 570, 631 S.E.2d at 772.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. (quoting Mahan, 256 Ga. App. at 261, 568 S.E.2d at 131).
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Importation of Solid Waste

E.

In Fulton County v. City of Atlanta,415 a case of first impression, the
41
Georgia Supreme Court held that O.C.G.A. section 36-1-16(a) 1
unconstitutionally impaired the free flow of commerce by giving Georgia
counties the power to veto the importation of solid waste.417 Under
O.C.G.A. section 36-1-16(a), transportation of solid waste across county
or state lines for the purpose of placement in a landfill is prohibited,
authorities of both the originating
unless authorized by the governing
418
county and the receiving county.
The City of Atlanta had entered into contracts with private solid waste
service companies to collect, transport, and dispose of the City's
municipal solid waste. Waste was collected in the City, taken to transfer
stations in Fulton County and Cobb County, and then transported to
Forsyth County and Butts County for disposal in landfills. Fulton
County brought an action in Fulton County Superior Court against the
City seeking a declaratory judgment and equitable relief for the City's
refusal to comply with O.C.G.A. section 36-1-16(a). The City moved for
judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 419 The City's
motion was granted, and Fulton County appealed.42 °
Upon review, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that the United States
Supreme Court had struck down a similar Michigan statute in Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources. 42' The Michigan statute in Fort Gratiot prohibited a private
landfill from receiving solid waste originating from outside the county
in which the landfill was located, unless such action was specifically

415. 280 Ga. 353, 629 S.E.2d 196 (2006).
416. O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16(a) (2006). This subsection provides,
No person, firm, corporation, or employee of any municipality shall transport,
pursuant to a contract, whether oral or otherwise, garbage, trash, waste, or refuse
across state or county boundaries for the purpose of dumping the same at a
publicly or privately owned dump, unless permission is first obtained from the
governing authority of the county in which the dump is located and from the
governing authority of the county in which the garbage, trash, waste or refuse is
collected.

Id.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Fulton County, 280 Ga. at 353, 629 S.E.2d at 196.
O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16(a).
Fulton County, 280 Ga. at 353, 629 S.E.2d at 196-97; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Fulton County, 280 Ga. at 353, 629 S.E.2d at 196.
Id.; 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
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approved in the county's solid waste management plan.422 The
Supreme Court held that even though the statute purported to regulate
only the intercounty transfer of solid waste, as opposed to interstate
transfer, the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate
commerce. 42" The Court noted that a state or a political subdivision
of the state "may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of
the State, rather that through the State itself."424 Thus, the Court
held the statute violated the Commerce Clause by allowing Michigan
counties to protect themselves from competition from out-of-state waste
425
producers

and isolate themselves

from the national

economy.

Moreover, the Court noted that no reason or rationale was given within
the statute to explain why solid waste coming from outside the county
should
be treated differently than waste generated within the coun26
4

ty.

The Georgia Supreme Court in Fulton County held that Fort Gratiot
was controlling and that O.C.G.A. section 36-1-16(a) impinged on the
Commerce Clause even more than the Michigan statute.427 While the
Michigan statute controlled the importation of solid waste into a county,
the court held that O.C.G.A. section 36-1-16(a) controlled both the
importation and exportation 2of9 solid waste.428 Accordingly, the superior court decision was upheld.

The court went on to hold that the superior court did have subject
matter jurisdiction because the City had notified the Attorney General
that it430was challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 36-116(a).

422.

Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 357 (citing MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.11513 (1999)

(originally codified as MICH. CoMP. LAwS § 299.413(a)).

423. Id. at 366-67.
424. Id. at 361.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Fulton County, 280 Ga. at 354 n.3, 629 S.E.2d at 197 n.3
428. Id.
429. Id. at 354, 629 S.E.2d at 197.
430. Id.; see Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 490, 175 S.E.3d 845, 846
(1970); Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 581, 129 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1963).

